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UNPACKING THE DETERRENT EFFECT OF
THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT:
LESSONS FROM KENYA
YVONNE M. DUTTON† AND TESSA ALLEBLAS††
INTRODUCTION
Decades in the making,1 the International Criminal Court
(“ICC”) began operating in The Hague, the Netherlands in 2002.2
The court’s creation left many commentators “hopeful”—hopeful
that the ICC would positively transform international criminal
law and reduce atrocities.3 Those high hopes are reflective of the
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1
States began discussing the idea of a permanent international criminal court
shortly after World War II and the culmination of the Nuremberg trials. Because of
the Cold War, however, four decades passed until states again turned their attention
to creating an international court with the mandate to prosecute international
crimes. ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 323–29 (2d ed. 2008).
2
About, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, www.icc-cpi.int/about (last visited
Aug. 8, 2017).
3
See Leila Nadya Sadat, The Establishment of the International Criminal
Court: From the Hague to Rome and Back Again, 8 J. INT’L L. & PRAC. 97, 117 (1999)
(stating that the passage of the Rome Statute raised hopes that “the normative
structure being created by international law might influence or even restrain the
Hobbesian order established by the politics of States”); John Washburn, The
Negotiation of the Rome Statute for the International Criminal Court and
International Lawmaking in the 21st Century, 11 PACE INT’L L. REV. 361, 361–62
(1999) (describing the cheers and applause that accompanied the passage of the
Rome Statute and stating that it reflected the expectation that the ICC “would
fundamentally change the application and enforcement of international criminal
law”).
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Preamble to the Rome Statute, the treaty that created the ICC. 4
According to the Preamble, the court aims to ensure that “the
most serious crimes of concern to the international community as
a whole must not go unpunished and that their effective
prosecution must be ensured . . . .”5 Further, the Preamble states
the determination to “put an end to impunity for the perpetrators
of these crimes and thus to contribute to the prevention of such
crimes . . . .”6 In other words, the ICC aims to produce a
deterrent effect7 through its prosecutions and the threat of
prosecutions.
There is, however, a clear divide amongst commentators as
to whether the ICC and the ad hoc international criminal
tribunals that were established before the permanent court can
hinder international crime. Supporters of international criminal
justice advocate for international criminal tribunals precisely
because they believe that the tribunals can, and do, deter mass
The ICC is no exception, with supporters
atrocities.8
emphasizing the court’s role in preventing international crime
and ending impunity for mass atrocities.9 The remarks of thenU.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan on the day the Rome Statute
entered into force are just one example of such support. He said,

4
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court Pmbl, July 17, 1998, 2187
U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter Rome Statute].
5
Id.
6
Id.
7
Deterrence theory predicts that the credible threat of legal punishment will
cause individuals to refrain from committing crimes in the future. See, e.g.,
Raymond Paternoster, How Much Do We Really Know About Criminal Deterrence?,
100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 765, 766 (2010); Gary S. Becker, Crime and
Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169, 204 (1968).
8
See, e.g., M. Cherif Bassiouni, Searching for Peace and Achieving Justice: The
Need for Accountability, 59 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 9, 18 (1996) (stating that
international prosecutions send a deterrence message and thus prevent future
victimization); Leslie Vinjamuri, Deterrence, Democracy, and the Pursuit of
International Justice, 24 ETHICS & INT’L AFF. 191, 192 (2010) (noting that both the
ad hoc tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and the ICC have cited to deterrence as
the principle justification for pursuing investigations of international crimes).
9
Jan Klabbers, Just Revenge? The Deterrence Argument in International
Criminal Law, 12 FINNISH Y.B. INT’L L. 249, 251 (2001) (concluding that the primary
reason states created the ICC was because they believed ensuring punishment of
international crimes would also reduce the incidence of such crimes).
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“We hope [the ICC] will deter future war criminals and bring
nearer the day when no ruler, no state, no junta and no army
anywhere will be able to abuse human rights with impunity.”10
On the other side of the divide are the skeptics. Critics
charge that the people who commit crimes within the ICC’s
jurisdiction are not rational actors and, therefore, cannot be
deterred.11 Other critics focus on the court’s institutional design,
insisting that discouraging international crime is unlikely
because prosecutions are necessarily infrequent, potential
punishments are not sufficiently severe, and the path to justice is
slow.12 Some scholars are even more pessimistic, stating that
insisting on justice through international prosecutions may
actually incentivize some perpetrators to continue human rights
violations or war crimes, thereby impeding prospects for peace.13
This Article seeks to reframe the debate about the ICC’s
deterrent effect by presenting a more nuanced understanding of
the particular circumstances under which the ICC is more and
less likely to deter. As a starting point, deterrence is a
complicated concept. To illustrate the need to “unpack” the ICC’s
deterrent effect, this Article takes a deep dive into a narrativedriven case study of Kenya and its relationship with the ICC over
time. Unique to this study is that it includes novel data:
information obtained during semi-structured interviews
conducted in Nairobi, Kenya during 2015 with high-level
subjects, including former government officials, journalists,
academics, and leaders in civil society, and think tanks.14
10
James F. Alexander, The International Criminal Court and the Prevention of
Atrocities: Predicting the Court’s Impact, 54 VILL. L. REV. 1, 10 (2009) (citing Marlise
Simons, Without Fanfare or Cases, International Court Sets Up, N.Y. TIMES (July 1,
2002)
http://www.nytimes.com/2002/07/01/world/without-fanfare-or-cases-internat
ional-court-sets-up.html).
11
See David Wippman, Atrocities, Deterrence, and the Limits of International
Justice, 23 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 473, 476 (1999); see also Frédéric Mégret, Three
Dangers for the International Criminal Court: A Critical Look at a Consensual
Project, 12 FINNISH Y.B. INT'L L. 193, 203 (2001).
12
See, e.g., Jack Goldsmith & Steven D. Krasner, The Limits of Idealism, 132
DÆDALUS 47, 55 (2003); Wippman, supra note 11, at 476.
13
See, e.g., Jack Snyder & Leslie Vinjamuri, Trials and Errors: Principle and
Pragmatism in Strategies of International Justice, 28 INT’L SECURITY 5, 20–23
(2004).
14
We conducted the interviews in Kenya as part of a multi-year project being
funded by The Hague Institute for Global Justice and entitled, “The Peace-Justice
Nexus: The Potential Impact of the ICC on Conflict, Mass Atrocities, and Human
Rights Violations.” In Kenya, the local partner that facilitated the interviews was
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Establishing with certainty a causal role for the ICC is
difficult, if not impossible. Nevertheless, these interviews show
how informed actors on the ground perceive the ICC’s deterrent
effect under varying circumstances and over time. Combined
with documentary data about what happened in Kenya before
and after it ratified the Rome Statute—with a specific focus on
those who have been targeted by the ICC—this Article
establishes a new model for evaluating and understanding the
ICC’s deterrent effect.
For several reasons, Kenya is a good case through which to
examine the complexities of the ICC’s deterrent effect. First,
Kenya joined the ICC in 2005 following a history of poor human
rights practices, weak domestic legal institutions, and a culture
of impunity.15 That poor starting record provides an opportunity
to seek evidence of improvements as a result of ICC commitment
and interaction. Second, in 2007 and 2008, Kenya experienced
an unprecedented level of elite-driven election-related violence
that left more than 1,000 dead and up to 500,000 displaced.16
Thereafter, Kenya became one of the first dozen countries where
the court intervened to investigate and prosecute.17
The ICC’s Office of the Prosecutor (“OTP”) brought crimes
against humanity charges against six high-level and influential
Kenyans based on the roles they allegedly played in
orchestrating the violence in 2007 and 2008.18 Among those the
OTP charged were Uhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto who, as of
March 2013, had become Kenya’s President
and Deputy

Nairobi Peace Initiative-Africa (NPI-Africa). In addition to Yvonne Dutton and Tessa
Alleblas, Eamon Aloyo, Senior Researcher at The Hague Institute, and Nahashon
Kariuki, Researcher at NPI-Africa, conducted the interviews on which this Article
draws. Because of the sensitivity of the topics addressed during the interviews,
interviews were conducted with the express promise not to identify interviewees by
name in any reports or publications.
15
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, KENYA AND THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT:
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS 1 (Jan. 2011), https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/r
elated_material/QA%20-%20Kenya%20and%20the%20ICC%2001.25.11.pdf.
16
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, BALLOTS TO BULLETS: ORGANIZED POLITICAL
VIOLENCE AND KENYA'S CRISIS OF GOVERNANCE 2 (Mar. 2008), http://www.unhcr.org
/refworld/docid/47de7bd22.html [hereinafter HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, BALLOTS TO
BULLETS].
17
Situations Under Investigation, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, https://ww
w.icc-cpi.int/pages/situations.aspx (last visited Aug. 8, 2017)
18
Kenya, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, https://www.icc-cpi.int/kenya (last
visited Aug. 8, 2017).
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President, respectively.19 In December 2013 and December 2014,
the ICC prosecutor dropped charges against former Secretary to
the Cabinet Francis Muthaura and Kenyatta, alleging that the
defendants had interfered with witnesses and that Kenya had
obstructed the OTP’s efforts to gather evidence.20 For the
purposes of this case study seeking to help unpack the ICC’s
deterrent effects, these facts are useful: They mean that there is
an opportunity to obtain evidence of how those in power respond
to the ICC’s threat of prosecution.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I begins by explaining
deterrence theory in more detail. It follows with an overview of
the debate surrounding the ability of international criminal
tribunals and the ICC to produce a deterrent effect.
In Part II, we advance our argument regarding the need to
reframe the debate about the ICC’s potential to deter. We
explain the reasons why the ICC’s deterrent effect must be
unpacked and, in doing so, we describe several factors that
influence whether and under what conditions the ICC should or
should not be able to deter. In Part III, we describe the
methodology for the Kenya case study that serves to both test
these hypotheses and illustrate the complexities of gauging the
ICC’s deterrent power.
Part IV unpacks the ICC’s deterrent effect by analyzing the
evidence from Kenya of (1) any decrease in mass atrocities or
other human rights abuses and (2) any increase in domestic
mechanisms available to punish those who commit such abuses.
That evidence shows that the ICC’s ability to deter can vary
depending on the particular political context of the targeted
state, the type of actor the ICC pursues, and based on how
strongly and well the ICC exercises its institutional powers. For
example, case study evidence shows that ratification, the lowest
level of ICC intervention, did not prevent incidences of mass
atrocities or other human rights abuses. On the other hand, the
case study shows some deterrent effect came as a result of a
19

Id.
See Statement by ICC Prosecutor on the Notice to Withdraw Charges Against
Mr. Muthaura, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT (Mar. 11, 2013), https://www.icccpi.int/legalAidConsultations?name=OTP-statement-11-03-2013; Statement of the
Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Fatou Bensouda, on the Withdrawal
of Charges against Mr. Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
(Dec. 5, 2014), https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=otp-statement-05-122014-2.
20
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higher level of ICC intervention, namely, after the ICC
prosecutor decided to launch cases against six Kenyans.
Nevertheless, the evidence also indicates that during that time
period the increased costs associated with the ICC’s interventions
may have influenced state leaders to commit abuses to help them
hold on to or gain power in order to thwart the ICC. Further,
while the ICC’s interventions seemed to produce some positive
effects, the evidence does not confirm any normative changes
consistent with a lasting and persistent deterrent effect.
I.
A.

DETERRENCE AND THE ICC

Deterrence Theory

According to deterrence theory, a well-designed criminal
justice system will deter individuals from committing crimes.21
There are two types of deterrence: specific and general.22 The
former posits that individuals who have endured punishments
because they committed crimes will want to avoid suffering a
similar fate again. The latter posits that society at large should
be generally deterred from committing crimes to avoid the
likelihood of being caught and punished.23
Deterrence theory imposes a rational choice economic
analysis to the study of criminal law.24 The theory assumes selfinterested, rational actors wish to maximize their utility and
choose the course of action that will produce the greatest benefits
at the lowest cost.25 It recognizes that each rational individual
may have some unique and different circumstances that inform

21
See, e.g., Payam Akhavan, Justice in the Hague, Peace in the Former
Yugoslavia? A Commentary on the United Nations War Crimes Tribunal, 20 HUM.
RTS. Q. 737, 744 (1998) [hereinafter Akhavan, Justice in the Hague]; Mark A.
Drumbl, Collective Violence and Individual Punishment: The Criminality of Mass
Atrocity, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 539, 588–89 (2005).
22
Miriam J. Aukerman, Extraordinary Evil, Ordinary Crime: A Framework for
Understanding Transitional Justice, 15 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 39, 63 (2002).
23
See, e.g., Paternoster, supra note 7, at 769; Wippman, supra note 11, at 476.
24
See, e.g., Paternoster, supra note 7, at 777–78 (referencing Gary S. Becker,
Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169, 172–76
(1968)); Christopher W. Mullins & Dawn L. Rothe, The Ability of the International
Criminal Court to Deter Violations of International Criminal Law: A Theoretical
Assessment, 10 INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 771, 773 (2010).
25
Wippman, supra note 11, at 476 (noting that arguments about deterrence
assume rational actor calculations weighing the benefits of crime against the risks of
punishment).
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the cost-benefit calculation.26 Nevertheless deterrence theory
assumes individuals will make decisions after rationally
weighing benefits against costs.27 The prediction is that
individuals will refrain from committing crimes when the
benefits of the criminal behavior are outweighed by the costs
associated with being charged, caught, and punished.28
The cost side of the question is the primary focus of
deterrence theory; those costs come in the form of legal sanctions
and social sanctions. Legal sanctions refer to the potential
punishments imposed by the criminal justice system. Social
sanctions refer to the complementary costs society may impose on
one who is charged with, or convicted of, a crime.29
Deterrence theory supposes that individuals will refrain
from committing crimes when the potential benefits of criminal
behavior are outweighed by the potential for legal sanctions that
are sufficiently (1) certain, (2) severe, and (3) swift.30 In other
words, “Other things being equal, a legal punishment is more
costly when it is more certain (more likely than not to be a
consequence of crime), severe (greater in magnitude), and swift
(the punishment arrives sooner rather than later after the
offense).”31 The questions of whether a punishment would
actually be certain, swift, and severe are not the only
considerations: what also matters is how individuals perceive the
cost side of the equation. Thus, “the effectiveness of any
deterrent depends on the potential offender’s perception of
possible sanctions, and on her assessment of her ability to evade
law enforcement.”32

26
See Patrick J. Keenan, The New Deterrence: Crime and Policy in the Age of
Globalization, 91 IOWA L. REV. 505, 516 (2006) (explaining that the rational actor
assumption allows weighing unique circumstances, for example, adding in to the
cost-benefit calculus the fact that an individual is poor or was abused).
27
Id. at 515. (explaining that according to the deterrence theory’s rational
choice assumption, individuals are forward-looking and behave so as to maximize
their utility).
28
Id. at 519; Paternoster, supra note 7, at 782–83.
29
See, e.g., Daniel S. Nagin, Criminal Deterrence Research at the Outset of the
Twenty-First Century, 23 CRIME & JUST. 1, 20–21 (1998).
30
See Paternoster, supra note 7, at 783.
31
Id.
32
Aukerman, supra note 22, at 64. See Paternoster, supra note 7, at 780
(explaining the evolution of deterrence theory to account for perceptions of objective
sanction threats).
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Although the cost side of the equation includes several
components relevant to the likelihood of punishment, studies
suggest the most important component is the certainty of
punishment.33 Empirical research shows that “when offenders do
not perceive a punishment as likely to be imposed, then there
will be little disincentive toward offending, no matter the celerity
or the proportionality of the punishment in question.”34 For
example, Durlauf and Nagin’s review of the empirical studies on
deterrence indicates that certainty-based sanctions policies—
such as increasing the visibility of police—as opposed to severitybased sanctions policies—such as increasing sentencing ranges—
are more effective at reducing crime.35 Although individuals must
perceive that punishment will be relatively certain should they
commit criminal acts, the literature suggests that a criminal
justice system need not punish all offenders for it to produce a
deterrent effect.36 Exemplary prosecutions may instead be
sufficient to send an effective deterrence message.37
As to social sanctions, they add to the cost side of the costbenefit equation because they constitute additional consequences
that may flow from a public indictment, arrest, or prosecution;
for example, the loss of social or employment prospects.38 Social
sanctions are not part of the cost equation for every individual in
every society.
In communities where crime is rampant,
individuals may face no social stigma or may even find their
reputations enhanced upon being publicly exposed as a

33

See Mullins & Rothe, supra note 24, at 773.
Id.
35
Steven N. Durlauf & Daniel S. Nagin, Imprisonment and Crime: Can Both Be
Reduced?, 10 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POLICY 1, 14, 37 (2011).
36
See Diane F. Orentlicher, Settling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute Human
Rights Violations of a Prior Regime, 100 YALE L.J. 2537, 2601 (1991) (arguing that
selective prosecution of some offenders is sufficient for effective deterrence).
37
See Aukerman, supra note 22, at 63–64 (noting that deterrence theory
operates on the premise that even exemplary punishments may adequately prevent
future crime).
38
Kirk R. Williams & Richard Hawkins, Perceptual Research on General
Deterrence: A Critical Review, 20 L. & SOC'Y REV. 545, 561 (1986) (referencing the
loss of social standing); Keenan, supra note 26, at 536 (referencing shame and social
censure); Hyeran Jo & Beth A. Simmons, Can the International Criminal Court
Deter Atrocity?, 70 INT’L ORG. 443, 450 (2016) (noting the potential loss of job
prospects, not because employment is legally barred, but because many employers
do not want to hire criminals).
34
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criminal.39 Within communities where crime is relatively rare
and considered morally unacceptable, individuals should expect
that such public exposure as a criminal will also result in the loss
of friendships, job opportunities, or social standing.40
B.

The Debate About the Deterrent Effect of International
Criminal Justice Mechanisms

Set out above is the theory. In the context of international
criminal justice, the theory has both supporters and critics.
Supporters typically cite to deterrence and prevention of future
crimes41 to justify the creation of and reliance on international
justice mechanisms.42 Professor Bassiouni, for instance, states
that international prosecutions and other accountability
measures “serve as deterrence, and thus prevent future
victimization.”43 The ICC’s supporters echo this same sentiment.
Non-governmental organizations reference the court’s role in
deterring future atrocities when urging universal ratification of
the Rome Statute.44 Kofi Annan, former U.N. Secretary-General,
39
See Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence, 83 VA.
L. REV. 349, 350 (1997).
40
Williams & Hawkins, supra note 38, at 563–66.
41
While many scholars suggest that the role of formal justice mechanisms is to
threaten punishment so as to prevent future atrocities, others justify international
criminal justice and punishment based on “expressive theories.” A court’s expressive
powers relate to its ability to signal through its prosecution decisions that certain
conduct is contrary to acceptable norms. For example, Margaret deGuzman argues
that “the ICC may effectively promote important moral norms with a small number
of illustrative prosecutions,” thereby also contributing to crime prevention. See
Margaret deGuzman, Choosing to Prosecute: Expressive Selection at the
International Criminal Court, 33 MICH. J. INT’L L. 265, 312, 315 (2012).
42
See, e.g., Alexander K.A. Greenawalt, Justice Without Politics? Prosecutorial
Discretion and the International Criminal Court, 39 N.Y.U. J. OF INT’L L. & POL.
583, 605 (2007) (noting that one commonly expressed hope for the ICC is that it will
generally deter future criminal activity); Vinjamuri, supra note 8, at 192
(referencing deterrence as the rationale for international justice investigations).
43
Bassiouni, supra note 8, at 18.
44
See, e.g., About Us, THE AMERICAN NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS
COALITION FOR THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, https://www.amicc.org/aboutus (“We share in common the conviction that perpetrators of atrocities must be held
accountable by the international community and that victims of these terrible crimes
deserve
justice.”); Genocide, ICC
NOW, http://iccnow.org/documents/FSICCandGenocide.pdf (“The ICC therefore stands as a deterrent against future
atrocities, and empowers the international community to react more rapidly through
an impartial, international judicial mechanism”); Statement by William R. Pace
Convenor, Coalition for the International Criminal Court for the 15th session of the
Assembly of States Parties, https://asp.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/ASP15/GenDeba/
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emphasized the ICC’s hoped-for deterrent effect in his remarks
following the adoption of the Rome Statute.45 The ICC’s first
prosecutor himself has noted that his mission according to the
Rome Statute is to end impunity for mass atrocities “in order to
contribute to the prevention of future crimes.”46
The critics do not dispute that deterrence and prevention of
future crimes is an oft-cited rationale for employing international
justice. They dispute that international tribunals, including the
ICC, can prevent future crimes through its threat of punishment.
Some critics focus on the “rational actor” assumption, arguing
that the types of people who commit serious international crimes
within the ICC’s jurisdiction are not rational actors, and
therefore, cannot be deterred.47 In particular, the assumption of
rationality may not always be valid where the context is “the
chaos of massive violence, incendiary propaganda, and upended
social order.”48 The argument is that under such circumstances
individuals may give little or no thought to the cost side of the
equation: they may be driven by political paranoia, genocidal
fanaticism, or swept up in some supremacist euphoria.49
Mégret’s quote is illustrative: “It beggars belief to suggest that

ICC-ASP15-GenDeba-NGO-CICC-ENG.pdf (“There is an urgent need to both end
and deter these most serious crimes of concern to the international community, and
to eradicate impunity for the perpetrators of these crimes.” “The Court plays a
central role in peace-building processes as the only permanent international
criminal court within an evolving system of international criminal justice, not least
through the Court’s contribution to guaranteeing lasting respect for, and the
enforcement of, international justice.”); Wippman, supra note 11, at 473 (stating that
the ICC’s supporters routinely reference the court’s role in deterring future atrocities
when urging states to ratify).
45
See Alexander, supra note 10, at 10.
46
Pursuing International Justice: A Conversation with Luis Moreno-Ocampo,
COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (Feb. 4, 2010), http://www.cfr.org/human-rights/
pursuing-international-justice-conversation-luis-moreno-ocampo/p34702.
47
See, e.g., Mégret, supra note 11, at 194; see also Payam Akhavan, Are
International Criminal Tribunals a Disincentive to Peace?: Reconciling Judicial
Romanticism with Political Realism, 31 HUM. RTS. Q. 624, 628 (2009) (“Some would
argue that the all-consuming primordial hatreds that motivate genocide defy the
simplistic rationalist assumption of cost-benefit calculus by perpetrators upon which
modern deterrence theories are based.”) [hereinafter Akhavan, Reconciling].
48
Drumbl, supra note 21, at 590.
49
See id. at 591 (querying rhetorically whether individuals imbued with
political paranoia will be able to view their actions as legally or morally wrong or
whether the genocidal fanatics engage in cost-benefit calculations).
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the average crazed nationalist purifier . . . will be deterred by the
prospect of facing trial.”50 Therefore, in some contexts, rational
choice may not be entirely possible.51
Critics reference another alleged problem with assuming
rationality in the mass atrocity context. At the time of action,
“moral norms may compel commission of crime more than fear
can deter them.”52 Mass atrocities are only possible because a
large swath of society participates in killing, raping, arson, or
other criminal behavior.53 In that context, individuals may view
their crimes as morally justifiable or necessary.54 Refusing to
commit the criminal act in the context of mass atrocities, as
commentators have noted, might even be regarded as socially
deviant behavior.55 Thus, social deterrence may have limited or
no relevance.
In addition, in such circumstances some
individuals are likely to exaggerate the perceived “benefits” of
their violent acts.
Other critiques focus on the cost side of deterrence theory’s
cost-benefit calculus.
Some commentators argue that
international criminal tribunals can produce little or no
deterrent effect because they are not capable of sending a signal
that those who commit mass atrocities or other human rights
abuses will likely be punished.56 According to Wippman, “Even if
we assume that those committing atrocities engage in rational
cost-benefit calculations . . . most probably view the risk of

50

Mégret, supra note 11, at 203.
Drumbl, supra note 21, at 591 (suggesting that in “the cataclysm of mass
violence,” rational choice may not be possible).
52
Pádraig McAuliffe, Suspended Disbelief? The Curious Endurance of the
Deterrence Rationale in International Criminal Law, 10 N.Z. J. PUB. & INT’L L. 227,
238 (2012).
53
See Drumbl, supra note 21, at 567 (noting that extraordinary international
crimes have “an organic and group component”).
54
See id. at 591; see also id. at 569–70 (suggesting that in the context of the
Rwandan genocide, the previous normative structure was suspended and replaced
by a normative structure whereby killing became a civic duty).
55
See McAuliffe, supra note 52, at 238; Drumbl, supra note 21, at 568.
56
Julian Ku & Jide Nzelibe, Do International Criminal Tribunals Deter or
Exacerbate Humanitarian Atrocities?, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 777, 832 (2006) (arguing
that international criminal tribunal prosecutions are not likely to produce any
meaningful deterrent effect because of the small numbers of persons prosecuted and
because the tribunals face constraints in administering sanctions); Drumbl, supra
note 21, at 590 (arguing that although “the chances of ‘getting caught’ for
committing egregious violations of human rights” have increased, they are still
“tiny”).
51
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prosecution as slight.”57 To support this position, he references
data from the International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
(“ICTY”), an institution that in six years issued some ninety-one
indictments and sentenced some six individuals.58 Wippman
asserts that these numbers are “minuscule relative to the
numbers of persons actually responsible for criminal violations of
international humanitarian law.”59 Other commentators offer
more general observations, arguing that in the absence of an
international criminal police force, an individual’s chance of
being arrested by an international criminal tribunal is less than
that of being arrested for a crime in a domestic jurisdiction with
a functioning democracy.60 Referencing that same lack of a police
force, Drumbl states that while the chance an individual will be
prosecuted for committing egregious violations of human rights
are higher now that the international justice paradigm has been
institutionalized, the chance “still remains tiny.”61
Although the ICC’s institutional design differs from that of
the ad hoc international tribunals, critics have specifically
challenged its ability to deliver a credible threat of certain
punishment. Goldsmith and Krasner argue that it is “wishful
thinking” that the ICC will “save many lives” in the future,
because, among other things, the ICC lacks a police force to
arrest the offenders who will hide behind national borders.62

57
Wippman, supra note 11, at 476; see also Diane Marie Amann, Assessing
International Criminal Adjudication of Human Rights Atrocities, 16 THIRD WORLD
LEGAL STUD. 169, 174 (2003) (stating that lack of resources and political
considerations tend to preclude international criminal tribunals from prosecuting
more than a few individuals, the result being that the rational individual may not be
deterred by the cost side of the cost-benefit calculus).
58
Wippman, supra note 11, at 476; see also Greenawalt, supra note 42, at 610
(suggesting that the number of individuals prosecuted by the ICTY was small since
after thirteen years in operation, the tribunal had prosecuted ninety-four individuals
and had indicted another sixty-seven who were either in custody or at large).
59
Wippman, supra note 11, at 476. Now that the ICTY has been operating for
over 20 years, the numbers that Wippman cites have gown. As of February 2016, the
ICTY has brought 161 indictments and sentenced eighty-three individuals. See Key
Figures of the Cases, UNITED NATIONS INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE
FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, http://www.icty.org/en/cases/key-figures-cases (last visited
Aug. 8, 2017).
60
McAuliffe, supra note 52, at 237.
61
Drumbl, supra note 21, at 590.
62
Goldsmith & Krasner, supra note 12, at 55; see also Jack Goldsmith, The SelfDefeating International Criminal Court, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 89, 92–94 (2003) (arguing
that since the ICC depends on states to arrest and transfer defendants, the court
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Wippman argues that the ICC will at best produce a modest
deterrent effect because it will not have sufficient resources or
broad enough political support to obtain jurisdiction over
suspects.63 Greenawalt states that the ICC’s jurisdictional limits
and its dependence on states present impediments to the court’s
ability to obtain jurisdiction over offenders; as a result of those
circumstances, Greenawalt finds that the ICC fails to send an
effective deterrence message.64 Likewise, Mullins and Rothe
emphasize that the ICC cannot obtain jurisdiction over non-state
parties without a Security Council referral. They argue that
states with veto powers or strong allies are guaranteed virtual
immunity from ICC prosecution, thereby negating the certainty
of punishment at least for actors in some parts of the world and
reducing the court’s ability to effectively deter.65
Finally, some scholars are even more pessimistic about the
prospects for deterrence in the context of international criminal
justice, arguing that pursuing charges against government or
rebel actors while conflicts are ongoing may perversely impede
prospects for peace.66 There is a broad discussion known as the
“peace versus justice debate” in the application of international
criminal law, conflict resolution, and conflict prevention that
postulates there may be a tradeoff between prosecution and the
realization of peace and the protection of human rights.67 In this
debate, “peace” refers to ending war and mass atrocities and
preventing them from occurring again in the future. “Justice”
generally refers to retributive criminal justice.68
lacks the institutional resources to ensure that indicted defendants actually appear
in The Hague).
63
Wippman, supra note 11, at 484–85; see also Mullins & Rothe, supra note 24,
at 778 (stating that the certainty of punishment is reduced because the ICC is
dependent on state parties and allied organizations to obtain custody over suspects).
64
Greenawalt, supra note 42, at 606.
65
Mullins & Rothe, supra note 24, at 777.
66
See, e.g., Snyder & Vinjamuri, supra note 13, at 5.
67
See, e.g., MARK KERSTEN, JUSTICE IN CONFLICT: THE EFFECTS OF THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT’S INTERVENTION ON ENDING WARS AND BUILDING
PEACE 4 (2016); Akhavan, Justice in the Hague, supra note 21, at 738 (referring to
“peace versus accountability”); Janine Natalya Clark, Peace, Justice and the
International Criminal Court: Limitations and Possibilities, 9 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST.
521, 521–22 (2011); Adam Branch, Uganda’s Civil War and the Politics of ICC
Intervention, 21 ETHICS & INT’L AFFS. 179, 179 (2007); Catherine Gegout, The
International Criminal Court: Limits, Potential and Conditions for the Promotion of
Justice and Peace, 34 THIRD WORLD Q. 800, 810 (2013).
68
Akhavan, Justice in the Hague, supra note 21, at 740.
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On the one hand, an international court or tribunal can have
a positive impact on “peace” through prosecutions that
potentially marginalize perpetrators, induce parties to enter
peace negotiations, or deter others. That same court or tribunal
could impede peace processes by creating perverse incentives
that encourage perpetrators to continue or resume war or human
rights violations.69 Therefore, insisting on justice can back
abusers into a corner and cause them to feel they have little
reason to refrain from committing atrocities if their only other
viable option is to be arrested and prosecuted—as opposed to, for
example, being offered amnesty.70 To illustrate the point, some
commentators argue that U.N. Security Council Resolution 1970,
which referred the Libya situation to the ICC in 2011, impeded a
political solution of a negotiated exit for Gaddafi and instead
forced him to fight to the end.71
II. REFRAMING THE DEBATE ABOUT THE ICC’S DETERRENT
EFFECT
We suggest that although the debate about the ICC’s likely
deterrent effect thus far has been useful, the time has come to
reframe the debate. We argue for a broader consideration and
greater understanding of how deterrence works and what factors
or circumstances will affect the likelihood of deterrence. We
begin that reframing below. First, we address the ICC’s critics,
laying out the reasons why we expect that the ICC can effectively
deter at least as to some actors in some situations. Because we
are interested in unpacking the ICC’s deterrent effect and

69
See, e.g., Snyder & Vinjamuri, supra note 13, at 12, 20–23; Goldsmith &
Krasner, supra note 12, at 51; see also KERSTEN, supra note 67, at 27 (noting that
critics of wars crimes trials argue that instead of marginalizing perpetrators, judicial
interventions may instead cause targets to (re)commit to violence).
70
See Goldsmith & Krasner, supra note 12, at 55 (arguing that by seeking to
prosecute, the ICC could aggravate conflicts and prolong political instability);
Branch, supra note 67, at 183–84 (explaining that proponents of the ICC’s
intervention in Uganda believe the intervention will aid in ending civil war, but that
critics argue that arrest warrants will cause rebels to abandon peace talks).
71
See, e.g., Leslie Vinjamuri & Jack Snyder, ICC Sheriff Too Quick on the Draw,
DUCK OF MINERVA (May 9, 2011), http://duckofminerva.com/2011/05/icc-sheriff-tooquick-on-draw.html; Mark Kersten, Libya, Peace and Justice: ‘Gaddafi Has To Go,’
but Peace Must Be Negotiated, JUSTICE IN CONFLICT (Apr. 18, 2011),
https://justiceinconflict.org/2011/04/18/libya-peace-and-justice-gaddafi-has-to-go-butpeace-must-be-negotiated/ (outlining the peace versus justice arguments advanced
with respect to the Libya situation).
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embracing nuances, however, we describe some factors that we
argue can influence whether the ICC is more or less likely to
deter. Those factors include (1) the domestic political context,
(2) the type of actor the ICC is targeting, and (3) the level of the
ICC’s intervention.
A.

The ICC Can Effectively Deter—At Least as to Some Actors in
Some Situations

Notwithstanding the arguments laid out above about the
limited ability of international criminal tribunals to deter, we
suggest that the ICC can effectively deter at least some actors
some of the time. We do not wholly disagree with all of the
critiques raised regarding the potential deterrent power of the
ICC. Nevertheless the criticisms do not unequivocally require a
conclusion that the ICC cannot sometimes effectively deter.
First, regarding the rational actor assumption, no doubt
some individuals are irrational sometimes and cannot be
deterred by the threat of sanctions. This is true in both the
domestic and international criminal justice contexts.
For
instance, some evidence shows that the threat of punishment
does not effectively deter those who commit crimes in the heat of
passion.72
Yet not all individuals who commit international crimes are
necessarily irrational all the time: Not all are megalomaniacs or
caught in some frenzy of activity that causes them to believe that
their violent acts are nevertheless moral.
Aukerman, for
example, distinguishes between “manipulators,” such as
Slobodan Milosevic, and “fanatics,” such as Hitler.
While
fanatics may not engage in a rational cost-benefit analysis,
manipulators make the rational choice to commit horrific
crimes.73 Mullins and Rothe point out that governments and
quasi-governmental systems do commit mass atrocities, with
individuals within bureaucracies planning those actions in order
to achieve a set of goals.
In such circumstances, senior
leadership who spend “a great amount of rational energy in
72
Jeffrey Fagan, Death and Deterrence Redux: Science, Law and Causal
Reasoning on Capital Punishment, 4 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 255, 291 (2006) (“No one
doubts that the criminal law, as well as other types of legal sanctions, have
deterrent effects, but the evidence suggests that such effects may be confined to risk
groups atypical of homicide offenders” who act out of passion).
73
Aukerman, supra note 22, at 68.
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plotting and planning such an event” likely also think about
“potential criminal responsibility.”74 In fact, new research by
political scientists rejects the “once widely held view that large
scale violence against civilian populations was irrational,
random, or the result of ancient hatreds between ethnic
groups.”75 Valentino’s survey of political science literature on
violence against civilians, including genocide, mass violence, and
terrorism shows that “most scholars studying political
violence . . . understand it to be primarily, if not exclusively,
instrumental and coordinated by powerful actors seeking to
achieve tangible political or military objectives.”76
Second, as to the cost side of the equation, we recognize that
like other international criminal tribunals the ICC will not be
able to prosecute every individual who plays a role in committing
a crime ostensibly within the court’s jurisdiction. Domestic
criminal justice systems similarly cannot arrest and bring to
justice every person who commits a crime.77 Still, the ICC has
strong enforcement powers to credibly signal a threat of
prosecution.78 It is a permanent court without temporal or
geographical jurisdictional limitations.79 The court’s permanence
alone adds a threat that should translate into greater
deterrence.80 Individuals may believe that states would not
74

Mullins & Rothe, supra note 24, at 775.
Benjamin Valentino, Why We Kill: The Political Science of Political Violence
Against Civilians, 17 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 89, 91 (2014).
76
Id.
77
In fact, in the domestic context many crimes go unreported which also means
that many individuals who commit crimes are not arrested and prosecuted. For
example, research reveals that about one-half of violent crimes committed between
the period 2006 and 2010 went unreported. See Press Release, Bureau of Just. Stat.,
Nearly 3.4 Million Violent Crimes Went Unreported to Police from 2006 to 2010,
(Aug. 9, 2012), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/press/vnrp0610pr.cfm.
78
Jo and Simmons also argue that the ICC’s design features should enable it to
produce a deterrent effect. Jo & Simmons, supra note 38, at 449 (“ICC
investigations, indictments, and convictions or those triggered by complementarity
are likely to encourage actual or potential perpetrators to reassess the risks of
punishment—relative to the status quo, which is often impunity—and to moderate
their behavior.”).
79
Id. at 451.
80
See, e.g., Kate Cronin-Furman, Managing Expectations: International
Criminal Trials and the Prospects for Deterrence of Mass Atrocity, 7 INT’L J.
TRANSITIONAL JUST. 434, 440–41 (2013) (stating that the ICC, “with its potentially
unlimited geographic jurisdiction . . . and prospective temporal jurisdiction”
represents a more likely institution than the ad hoc international criminal tribunals
“for triggering a deterrent effect”); Akhavan, Reconciling, supra note 47, at 634
75
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spend the time or money to create a new ad hoc tribunal to
address a mass atrocity; but the ICC already exists.81 The
existence of the ICC thus means that the Security Council has a
ready-made institution to which to refer situations, and it has
done so in the situations of Sudan and Libya.
We suggest that the ICC has been designed with broad legal
authority and strong enforcement powers to signal a credible
threat of prosecution. By committing to the ICC, states grant the
court automatic jurisdiction over the crimes of genocide, crimes
against humanity, and war crimes.82 Moreover, states agree that
an independent ICC prosecutor may try a state’s own nationals
for mass atrocities should the ICC determine that the state is
unwilling or unable to do so domestically.83 These powers are
significantly greater than those typically seen in human rights
treaties: Those treaties generally only require that states selfreport compliance and contain no mechanism to punish noncompliant behavior.84
The ICC also has more extensive
jurisdiction and influence compared to the various international
ad hoc criminal tribunals. The ad hoc tribunals do prosecute
individuals, but they have geographic and temporal limitations
focusing on crimes committed within a specific time frame on a
specific territory, that of the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda,
respectively.85 Indeed, as Jo and Simmons note, by ratifying the
Rome Statute creating the ICC, states have necessarily increased
the possibility that their citizens will face an international
criminal prosecution.86
Thus, the ICC has the power to investigate crimes, issue
arrest warrants, and prosecute and sentence perpetrators of
mass atrocities. And the court has exercised these powers during
its fifteen years in operation. As of August 2017, the ICC has
brought charges against individuals in twenty-five cases based
(“Given the ICC’s permanent status, its preventive capacity is at least notionally
enhanced because, unlike the ICTY and ICTR, there is no lapse of time between the
commission of atrocities and the establishment of its jurisdiction.”).
81
See YVONNE M. DUTTON, RULES, POLITICS, AND THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT: COMMITTING TO THE COURT 3 (Routledge 2013).
82
Rome Statute, supra note 4, at arts. 5–8, 11, 12(2).
83
Id. at arts. 5–8, 11, 12(2), 13.
84
DUTTON, supra note 81, at 15–17 (detailing the oversight and compliance
mechanisms in the various international human rights treaties).
85
Id. at 19–20 (comparing the powers of the ad hoc tribunals to those of the
ICC).
86
Jo and Simmons, supra note 38, at 445–46.
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on ten “situations.”87 To date, the ICC has issued about thirty
arrest warrants.88
Two of the individuals charged with
committing international crimes have been convicted and
sentenced: In 2012, the court sentenced Congolese warlord
Thomas Lubanga to fourteen years imprisonment for war crimes
based on his role in conscripting child soldiers.89 In 2014, the
court sentenced Germain Katanga to twelve years imprisonment
for crimes against humanity and war crimes committed in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo.90
Critics would argue that these numbers are not significant.
Yet the numbers demonstrate that the ICC is using its powers to
prosecute. For individuals who were accustomed to the status
quo of impunity and considered themselves “untouchable,” the
risk of investigation and prosecution has increased.91
Critics would likewise argue that the ICC has not obtained
custody over every one of the individuals against whom arrest
warrants have been issued. Absent a voluntary surrender, the
ICC must rely on states to capture and transfer suspects. We
make several points in response. First, some suspects have
voluntarily surrendered, and states have aided in the capture
and transfer of others.92 Second, the public signal of a legally-

87
Those situations include Uganda, the Democratic Republic of the Congo
(“DRC”), the Central African Republic, Mali, Sudan, Libya, Kenya, and Côte d’Ivoire,
and Central African Republic II. See Situations Under Investigation,
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/cases.aspx (last
visited Aug. 22, 2017).
88
See Office of the Prosecutor, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, https://www.
icc-cpi.int/Pages/defendants-wip.aspx (listing the names of defendants against whom
the ICC issued arrest warrants).
89
See Press Release, International Criminal Court, Thomas Lubanga Dyilo
Sentenced to 14 Years of Imprisonment (July 10, 2012), https://www.icccpi.int/drc/lubanga/Documents/LubangaEng.pdf.
90
See Press Release, International Criminal Court, Germaine Katanga
Sentenced to 12 Years’ Imprisonment (May 23, 2014), https://www.icccpi.int/drc/katanga/Documents/KatangaEng.pdf.
91
See Jo & Simmons, supra note 38, at 452 (noting that while the absolute risk
of being punished by the ICC is small, it “is much higher than was the case when
impunity was the default”).
92
In fact, all six of the original Kenyan suspects voluntarily appeared in The
Hague to face charges in April 2011 after receiving summonses to appear. Cases &
Situations: Kenya, COALITION FOR THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT,
http://www.iccnow.org/?mod=kenya&idudctp=20&show=all. For a list of the six
individuals over whom states have obtained custody, see Office of the Prosecutor,
INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL
COURT,
https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/defendantswip.aspx.
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issued warrant for arrest—even if it goes unexecuted—still
contributes to the ICC’s ability to send an effective deterrence
message. Suspects may escape arrest by staying within their
country’s own borders or visiting only friendly states. President
Bashir has been able to travel to some “friendly” countries in the
past, including Kenya, without being arrested.93 On the other
hand, the evidence demonstrates that the pending arrest warrant
has placed limits on Bashir’s freedom. He has not traveled to the
United States or Europe. In 2013, Bashir threatened to attend a
meeting of the United Nations General Assembly, but he
canceled the trip after the United States repeatedly warned that
it could not guarantee he would not be arrested.94 In only June
2015, Bashir visited South Africa, but was forced to flee while a
South African court considered whether the country was
obligated to arrest him.95 Indeed, one interviewee, a former
government official in Kenya, made a similar point about
Bashir’s restrictions because of the ICC in emphasizing that the
Sudanese president departed from a South African military base
so as to avoid a citizens’ arrest.96 In short, even unexecuted
warrants impose restrictions that some may wish to avoid by not
committing crimes that could subject them to the ICC’s
jurisdiction.
Another feature of the ICC’s design is also important to the
deterrence calculus: The fact that the ICC’s jurisdiction is
complementary. The court may only obtain jurisdiction as a last
resort if the state does not initiate domestic prosecutions to hold
The
perpetrators of the covered crimes accountable.97
complementarity provision necessarily operates to limit the ICC’s
exercise of jurisdiction. However, the complementarity principle

93
Peter Leftie & Kevin Kelly, Storm over al-Bashir’s Surprise Visit, DAILY
NATION (Aug. 28, 2010), http://www.nation.co.ke/Kenya%20Referendum/Storm%20
over%20al%20Bashir%20/-/926046/998960/-/69nwjj/-/.
94
Colum Lynch, Sudan’s Omar al-Bashir Cancels U.N. Trip, FOREIGN POLICY
(Sept. 25, 2013, 6:34 PM), http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/09/25/sudans-omar-albashir-cancels-u-n-trip-2/.
95
South Africa Criticised over Sudan’s Omar al-Bashir’s Exit, BBC NEWS (June
24, 2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-33254003.
96
Interview with Subject 898.
97
Rome Statute, supra note 4, at art. 17 (providing that the ICC may exercise
jurisdiction over the covered crimes if the state is “unwilling or unable genuinely” to
proceed domestically).
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also arguably increases the ICC’s potential deterrent effect by
threatening not only an international prosecution, but also
domestic prosecutions.98
The evidence shows that the ICC is employing its powers to
encourage states to investigate and prosecute covered crimes
domestically.
The OTP is using its powers to conduct
preliminary examinations of situations that may give rise to a
formal ICC investigation in the event that jurisdictional
prerequisites are satisfied—including the absence of genuine
national proceedings.99 According to a Policy Paper issued by the
OTP, the goals of the office’s preliminary investigation activities
include (1) ending impunity, by encouraging genuine national
The OTP
proceedings and (2) the prevention of crimes.100
employs different tools and strategies to encourage genuine
national proceedings through its preliminary examinations,
including sending in-country missions and holding consultations
with national authorities and NGOs.101 As to the “prevention”
function, the OTP notes that during preliminary examinations,
the office often issues public statements that serve to warn
perpetrators of the ICC’s interest and the potential for
international or domestic prosecutions should perpetrators not
cease committing crimes.102 Between 2004 and 2015, the OTP
has commenced a total of twenty-three preliminary
examinations: nine were ongoing as of January 2016, nine led to
a decision to proceed, and five led to a decision not to proceed.103

98

Id.
See ICC OTP, POLICY PAPER ON PRELIMINARY EXAMINATIONS 8–17 (Nov.
2013),
https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/otp/OTP-Policy_Paper_Preliminary_Examin
ations_2013-ENG.pdf (describing in detail the statutory factors that must be
satisfied to commence a formal investigation).
100
Id. at 4.
101
Id. at 24. The OTP has referred to this process of encouraging national
prosecutions as its “positive approach to complementarity.” ICC OTP,
PROSECUTORIAL STRATEGY 2009-2012 5 (Feb. 1, 2010), http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/
rdonlyres/66A8DCDC-3650-4514-AA62-D229D1128F65/281506/OTPProsecutorial
Strategy20092013.pdf.
102
ICC OTP, POLICY PAPER ON PRELIMINARY EXAMINATIONS, supra note 99, at
24–25 (referencing public statements made in connection with various preliminary
examinations).
103
ICC ASP, REPORT OF THE COURT ON THE BASIC SIZE OF THE OFFICE OF THE
PROSECUTOR 28 ICC-ASP/14/21 (Sept. 17, 2015), https://asp.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_
docs/ASP14/ICC-ASP-14-21-ENG.pdf.
99
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The countries where preliminary examinations were ongoing
included Afghanistan, Colombia, Guinea, Iraq, Nigeria,
Palestine, and Ukraine.104
Further, some evidence shows that the ICC’s preliminary
examinations
do
produce
some
of
the
hoped-for
“complementarity” effects. For example, the OTP began a
preliminary examination in Colombia in June 2004.105 The
examination reportedly put pressure on the Colombian courts
and prosecutors to pursue accountability for mass atrocities and
other human rights abuses.106 Anecdotal evidence also indicates
that the preliminary examination put pressure on state and nonstate actors to conform their behavior so they could avoid being
prosecuted by the ICC.107 According to a cable published by
Wikileaks, former president Pastrana “voiced concern that the
[ICC] could attempt to prosecute him for allegedly creating a
safehaven for narcoterrorists through the Caguan process.”108
The preliminary examination apparently played a role in
104
See Preliminary Examinations, ICC https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/Prelimi
nary-Examinations.aspx (last visited Aug. 8, 2017).
105
ICC OTP, SITUATION IN COLOMBIA: INTERIM REPORT 2 (Nov. 2012),
https://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/3D3055BD-16E2-4C83-BA85-35BCFD2A7922
/285102/OTPCOLOMBIAPublicInterimReportNovember2012.pdf.
106
See, e.g., Amanda Lyons & Michael Reed-Hurtado, The Rome Statute Review
Conf., Colombia: Impact of the Rome Statute and the International Criminal Court,
INT'L. CTR. FOR TRANSITIONAL JUST. 4 (May 2010), https://www.ictj.org/sites/default/f
iles/ICTJ-Colombia-Impact-ICC-2010-English.pdf. (noting that visits and statements
of the ICC prosecutor put pressure on judges and prosecutors); Kirsten Ainley, The
Responsibility to Protect and the International Criminal Court: Counteracting the
Crisis, 91 INT’L AFFS. 37, 48–49 (2015) (suggesting that the ICC’s threat of
prosecution produced positive impact in Colombia in terms of improving domestic
protections against impunity for mass atrocities and other human rights abuses).
107
Nick Grono, The Deterrent Effect of the ICC on the Commission of
International Crimes by Government Leaders, CRISIS GROUP (Oct. 6, 2012),
https://www.crisisgroup.org/global/deterrent-effect-icc-commission-internationalcrimes-government-leaders.
108
Ambassador’s November 1 Meeting with Former President Andres Pastrana,
WIKILEAKS (Nov. 14, 2007), https://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/07BOGOTA
8045_a.html. To the extent Pastrana was referencing peace talks in Caguan in the
late 1990s, he may be incorrect in surmising that the ICC would have jurisdiction
over any encompassed crimes. See Darynell Rodriguez Torres, Colombia’s Peace
Process: Three Challenges, OPEN DEMOCRACY (Oct. 15, 2012), https://www.opend
emocracy.net/opensecurity/darynell-rodriguez-torres/colombias-peace-process-threechallenges. Colombia did not join the ICC until 2002 after those talks had ended,
and it also included a reservation exempting Colombia from the ICC’s jurisdiction
over war crimes. See Colombia’s ICC Declaration a “Prelude to Impunity,” HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH (Sept. 5, 2002), https://www.hrw.org/news/2002/09/05/colombias-iccdeclaration-prelude-impunity.
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prompting Colombia to pass its 2005 Peace and Justice Law.109
The Colombian government itself has claimed that as a result of
the ICC’s preliminary examination (1) some 18,000 weapons have
been surrendered and destroyed; (2) the main leaders of rebel
groups are behind bars awaiting trials; (3) more than 280,000
people have been registered as victims; and (4) the country has
investigated more than 36,000 previously unknown criminal
actions.110
In addition, the OTP’s assessment of the facts on the ground
is positive as to the “complementarity” effect in Colombia. In
2009, then-ICC Prosecutor Ocampo stated that “I can say the
system is working. They, in their domestic law, have cases
against paramilitaries, guerrillas and even against their own
military, so much so that other states have opted to use Colombia
as an example to do the same. That’s why we do not have to
intervene.”111 Prosecutor Bensouda has similarly concluded that
the facts in Colombia demonstrate a positive complementarity
effect. She stated that “the prospect of the ICC attaining
jurisdiction was mentioned by prosecutors, courts, legislators and
members of the Executive Branch as a reason to make policy
choices in implementing the Justice and Peace Law, thus
ensuring that the main perpetrators of crimes would be
prosecuted.”112
In other words, what counts towards the ICC’s deterrence
message about the certainty of prosecution is not only the cases
commenced by the ICC. That message is supplemented by the
ICC’s ability to coerce states to institute domestic proceedings so

109
Grono, supra note 107; see also Lyons & Reed-Hurtado, supra note 106, at 5
(quoting the High Commissioner for Peace who said, “The government has proposed
a draft law that will block the action of the International Criminal Court”); Luis
Carlos Restrepo, Revelaciones Explosivas, SEMANA (Sept. 24, 2004),
http://www.semana.com/nacion/articulo/revelaciones-explosivas/68391-3 (quoting the
High Commissioner for Peace in Spanish: “Esta no es un peligro. El gobierno ofreció
un proyecto de ley que bloquea la acción de la Corte Penal Internacional”).
110
Ainley, supra note 106, at 48 n.47.
111
Bryon Wells, Colombian Judicial System Works: ICC Official, COLUMBIA
REPORTS (Dec. 9, 2009), http://colombiareports.com/colombian-judicial-system-isworking-properly-foreign-observer-says/.
112
Fatou Bensouda, Deputy Prosecutor, International Criminal Court, Keynote
Address at the Africa Legal Aid, Commonwealth Secretariat, and International
Legal Assistance Consortium: The International Criminal Court in a Politically
Divided World (Oct. 21, 2011), http://www.internationallawbureau.com/blog/wpcontent/uploads/2012/04/here1.pdf.
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they can avoid having their citizens prosecuted in The Hague.
Ratification of the Rome Statute not only increases the possibility
of international prosecution, but also the possibility of domestic
prosecution.
Based on all of the above, we suggest that the ICC can
effectively deter at least some actors some of the time. By joining
the ICC, states have necessarily increased the threat of an ICC
prosecution. Because of the ICC’s complementarity provision,
states also increase the threat that their citizens will be
prosecuted domestically. Because joining the ICC raises the cost
side of the cost-benefit equation, individuals should generally be
less likely than before to commit acts that can constitute crimes
within the ICC’s jurisdiction. In addition, state leaders should
value state sovereignty and generally want to avoid having their
citizens prosecuted. They should want to discourage individuals
from committing acts that can constitute any of the ICC core
crimes and also ensure that the state’s laws and institutions will
permit the state to prosecute its citizens domestically should they
commit any of the ICC crimes.113
Although there is scant empirical literature examining the
question of whether the ICC deters, the few studies to date
support our conclusion that the ICC can sometimes produce a
deterrent effect. For example, Akhavan examined documentary
evidence from Uganda and Ivory Coast and concluded that (1) the
ICC led to a decrease in violence in Uganda and compelled
Joseph Kony to negotiate and that (2) the mere threat of an ICC
prosecution contributed to diffusing a volatile situation in Ivory
Coast.114 Nouwen conducted a qualitative study examining the
effect of the ICC’s complementarity provision in Uganda and
113
Some states have self-referred matters to the ICC for prosecution—behavior
which could indicate that states do not want to guard their sovereignty and ward
against an ICC intervention. In those self-referrals, however, the OTP has only
targeted non-state actors—not the governments against whom those non-state
actors were fighting when they committed their crimes. KERSTEN, supra note 67, at
164–65. Thus, as some commentators note, governments might at times “use” the
court. Id. at 167. Recent comments by President Museveni, the person who gave the
ICC its first case, support such a conclusion. Museveni has called on all African
states to quit the court, charging the court with being anti-African and challenging
its decision to charge African leaders with crimes. See Wang Ntui Belle, African
Countries to Quit the International Criminal Court, THE AFRICAN EXPONENT (Oct.
18, 2016), https://www.africanexponent.com/post/8063-african-countries-to-quit-theinternational-criminal-court.
114
Akhavan, Reconciling, supra note 47, at 640, 640–43.
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Sudan, looking for evidence of whether the ICC’s intervention
had encouraged domestic prosecutions of conflict-related crimes
and reform of criminal justice systems. Based on documentary
and interview evidence of high-level subjects, she found some law
reform. On the other hand, she found little evidence of an
increase in prosecutions.115 In a large-N statistical study on the
ICC’s deterrent effect, Jo and Simmons found that ICC
ratification, as well as an increase in ICC investigations over
time, was associated with a reduction in intentional civilian
killings, a finding they attribute to both the legal deterrent effect
from the possibility of punishment and a complementary social
deterrent effect.116
The documentary and interview evidence we gathered
during this Kenya case study will contribute to this scant
literature that empirically examines the ICC’s deterrent effect.
Through this evidence, however, we also make an important
theoretical contribution to the literature debating the deterrent
effect of international criminal justice. We illustrate the need to
“unpack” the ICC’s deterrent effect and thereby establish a new
model for evaluating and understanding the circumstances under
which deterrence is more or less likely to occur.
B.

Nuancing the ICC’s Deterrent Effect

While the ICC is generally designed to deter, we do not
expect that it can necessarily deter all actors in all situations all
the time. We suggest that several factors will influence the ICC’s
ability to deter: (1) the domestic political context, (2) the type of
actor the ICC is targeting, and (3) the level of the ICC’s
intervention.
First, as to the domestic political context, we distinguish
between democracies and non-democracies—or unconsolidated
democracies. For the most part, democracies generally have good
human rights practices and should not expect their citizens to
commit the kinds of acts that would subject them to an ICC

115
See SARAH M. H. NOUWEN, COMPLEMENTARITY IN THE LINE OF FIRE: THE
CATALYSING EFFECT OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT IN UGANDA AND
SUDAN 337 (2013).
116
Jo & Simmons, supra note 38, at 460–66 (conducting what appears to be the
most sophisticated large-N statistical study to date on the question of the ICC’s
deterrent effect).
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prosecution.117
Democracies also tend to have developed
independent law enforcement institutions that should enable
them to prosecute any such abuses in domestic courts.118 We
expect that state and non-state actors in democracies will
consider the ICC’s threat of prosecution as a cost to be calculated.
However, such states may view the threat of an ICC prosecution
as miniscule because the state will prosecute citizens in its
domestic courts should citizens commit abuses.119 In terms of a
visible ICC deterrent effect, one may not see an improvement in
human rights practices, since states with good practices do not
expect their citizens to commit mass atrocities or other human
rights abuses.120 The ICC could still produce a legal deterrent
effect on democracies. For example, joining the ICC could cause
these states to implement the ICC crimes into domestic
legislation so that the state has greater assurances that it can
prosecute such crimes domestically.121

117
See Oona A. Hathaway, The Cost of Commitment, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1821,
1839–40, 1840 n.60 (2003) (stating and showing that democracies tend to have better
human rights practices than non-democracies).
118
See, e.g., Wade M. Cole, Sovereignty Relinquished? Explaining Commitment
to the International Human Rights Covenants, 1966-1999, 70 AM. SOC. REV. 472,
475–76 (2005) (explaining that democratic states generally protect basic human
rights, apply the rule of law fairly, and limit state power whereas non-democracies
tend not to place legal constraints on their power).
119
See, e.g., DUTTON, supra note 81 (arguing that democracies with good human
rights practices will be the type of state most likely to join the ICC because
compliance costs are minimal in that they should not expect their citizens to commit
mass atrocities); Beth A. Simmons & Allison Danner, Credible Commitments and the
International Criminal Court, 64 INT’L ORG. 225, 231 (2010) (hypothesizing in their
article examining state commitment to the ICC that states with good practices and
strong institutions of domestic accountability are less likely to view ICC
commitment as costly).
120
Simmons and Danner make the point in their article examining commitment
to the ICC that one reason “peaceful” states like those in Scandinavia may have
joined the court is because they would not expect their nationals would ever be
subjected to its jurisdiction. Simmons & Danner, supra note 119, at 231.
121
For example, Germany implemented the ICC crimes into its domestic
legislation in 2002 before joining the ICC. See Andreas Zimmermann, Main Features
of the New German Code of Crimes against International Law
(Völkerstrafgesetzbuch), in NATIONAL LEGISLATION INCORPORATING INTERNATIONAL
CRIMES: APPROACHES OF CIVIL AND COMMON LAW COUNTRIES 138–39 (Matthias
Neuner ed., 2003).
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Non-democracies and unconsolidated democracies122 differ in
important respects from democracies—in respects that also affect
our calculus regarding the ICC’s potential deterrent effect. In
both, the executive is not fully independent from other branches
of government and does not fully respect the rule of law.123
Therefore, we also expect that these states will have poorer
human rights practices, weaker domestic legal institutions than
democracies, or both.124 Because they may be more likely targets
of an ICC investigation, non-democracies and unconsolidated
democracies may also be less likely to join the ICC than states
with better practices and policies.125 To the extent that states
with these weaker characteristics do join the court, to avoid the
threat of an ICC prosecution and the accompanying loss of
sovereignty, they will have to either ensure that their citizens do
not commit crimes within the ICC’s jurisdiction or ensure that
they have the level of domestic law enforcement institutions to
enable a domestic prosecution of such crimes should they occur.
We expect the evidence of deterrence among member states that
joined with weaker policies and practices to be greater because
the risk of a prosecution is also greatest in these states.
The second factor identified above—the target of the ICC’s
investigation—is also relevant to the deterrence calculus. We
suggest that the ICC may produce an unintended or perverse
effect if it focuses its attention on leaders of non-democracies or

122
“Unconsolidated democracies” are those states that have not fully
transitioned to a democracy. They are states that do not fully respect the rule of law
and where the executive is not fully independent from other branches of
government. See JUAN J. LINZ & ALFRED STEPAN, PROBLEMS OF DEMOCRATIC
TRANSITION AND CONSOLIDATION: SOUTHERN EUROPE, SOUTH AMERICA, AND POSTCOMMUNIST EUROPE 3 (1996) (“A democratic transition is complete when sufficient
agreement has been reached about political procedures to produce an elected
government, when a government comes to power that is the direct result of a free
and popular vote, when this government de facto has the authority to generate new
policies, and when the executive, legislative and judicial power generated by the new
democracy does not have to share power with other bodies de jure.”).
123
See id.
124
See Hathaway, supra note 117, at 1839–40, 1840 n.60 (stating and showing
that democracies tend to have better human rights practices than non-democracies).
125
See DUTTON, supra note 81 (finding from quantitative and qualitative
analysis that states with poorer human rights practices and weaker domestic law
enforcement institutions were less likely to join the ICC than states with good
practices and policies).
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unconsolidated democracies.126 In this political context, where a
potential ICC intervention threatens a hold on power or push to
gain power, state actors may respond by committing human
rights abuses that specifically aid them in holding on to or
gaining power. This hypothesis is based on our assessment that
state leaders in such a situation may rationally view the benefits
of power as being exceptionally high and the risks of prosecution
as exceptionally low. As to benefits, state leaders in nondemocracies or unconsolidated democracies do not have only
political “power” per se, but they also frequently have exceptional
access to state resources that they can siphon off to themselves or
their cohorts.127 As to costs, domestically these actors may face
little risk of prosecution for any crimes they commit since
domestic law enforcement mechanisms often do not function
fairly and independently from government.128 Furthermore, they
wield power over the citizenry and control government resources,
including the resources that could be used to punish themselves

126
We group non-democracies and unconsolidated democracies together because
both share features important to our hypothesis regarding leader control over
government resources. As O’Donnell notes, while many countries have in theory rid
themselves of authoritarian regimes, even when they hold elections, their brand of
government still may resemble an autocracy more than an established democracy.
Guillermo O’Donnell, Illusions About Consolidation, 7 J. DEMOC. 34, 34 (1996).
Thus, even if a state holds free elections but fails to consolidate and institutionalize
checks and balances on executive power and respect for the rule of law, we do not
consider it an established or consolidated democracy.
127
See, e.g., Alina Mungiu-Pippidi, Controlling Corruption Through Collective
Action, 24 J. DEMOC. 101, 101 (2013) (stating that while the “most egregious
examples of ‘state capture’ are found in autocracies,” new democracies increasingly
are producing a regime where rulers monopolize power and treat the state as their
own, practicing “a similarly nonuniversal allocation of public resources based on
patronage, nepotism, and the exchange of favors”); Douglas Marcouiller & Leslie
Young, The Black Hole of Graft: The Predatory State and the Informal Economy, 85
AM. ECON. REV. 630, 630 (1995) (“[I]n states with inadequate democratic checks and
balances, the apparatus of orderly government is all too often hijacked by a
predatory oligarchy who siphon the national treasury and transform government
bureaus into bribe-collection agencies which impede legitimate business.”); Gary
Milante, A Kleptocrat’s Survival Guide: Autocratic Longevity in the Face of Civil
Conflict 2 (World Bank, Washington D.C., Policy Research Working Paper No. 4186,
2007) (referencing the kleptocratic tendencies of authoritarian regimes whereby
political elites use state resources to reward their client and patron networks, as
opposed to the populace more generally).
128
See, e.g., Hathaway, supra note 117, at 1838–39 (explaining that nondemocracies tend to have few internal enforcement mechanisms to hold government
accountable); id. at 1840 (stating that democracies are more likely than nondemocracies to exhibit a commitment to the rule of law).
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for abuses. These actors may also underestimate the threat of an
ICC action because their positions give them an ability to
“manipulate” the international justice system—one that relies
heavily on state cooperation.
In short, in some circumstances, we expect that the threat of
an ICC prosecution will produce an unintended or perverse effect
and cause some individuals targeted by the ICC to commit
abuses. We draw on the literature discussing the potential
tradeoff between “justice” and “peace” to support this
hypothesis.129 Our focus with this argument is on leaders in nondemocracies or unconsolidated democracies. We argue that a
threat that the ICC might interfere with a hold on power or effort
to gain power may push such leaders “into a corner” and cause
them to conclude that there is little reason to refrain from
committing abuses that can aid them in their bid for power.
Whether the ICC produces a deterrent or perverse effect on
the leaders of non-democracies or unconsolidated democracies
may depend on our third identified factor—the level of the ICC’s
intervention. A lower level of ICC intervention lowers the cost
side of the equation, making it more likely that a rational actor
will not be deterred from committing abuses. As the ICC’s level
of intervention increases, so too does the cost side of the
equation, making it more likely that the ICC can produce a
deterrent effect and by its threat dissuade individuals from
committing crimes and persuade the government to institute
measures of domestic accountability. In such a case, the ICC has
demonstrated its power to act. While state leaders will still
highly value retaining or gaining positions of power, committing
obvious acts that can constitute any of the ICC core crimes could
prove very costly since such moves could attract additional
attention from the international community and the ICC.130
129
See, e.g., Akhavan, Reconciling, supra note 47, at 625 (describing the “peace
versus justice” dilemma: “whether, in certain circumstances, the prospect of
prosecution creates a disincentive for implicated leaders to end war or surrender
power”).
130
For example, in the case of Libya, in 2011, Gaddafi’s obvious attacks on
civilians, which included the government’s use of live fire on peaceful protestors,
attracted the attention of the international community. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH,
WORLD REPORT 2012: LIBYA EVENTS OF 2011 2 (2012) (noting the international
response to Gaddafi’s “crackdown” on peaceful anti-government protestors). In
February 2011, the Security Council referred the Libya situation to the ICC, noting,
among other things, the government’s widespread and systematic attacks against
the civilian population. See S.C. Res. 1970 ¶¶ 4–6 (Feb. 26, 2011).
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Nevertheless, a very high level of ICC intervention may cause
suspects to believe they have no opportunity for escape. When
leaders feel especially threatened, they will have more reason to
value gaining power or staying in power: With power, they can
manipulate state machinery so that abuses are not uncovered or
punished at the domestic or international level. If leaders put
such a high value on power, they may also see little reason to
refrain from committing crimes that will aid them in their quest
to gain power or stay in power.
Finally, although we do not disagree that social deterrence
plays an important role in complementing legal deterrents, we do
not envision a significant role for social deterrence as regards
leaders in non-democracies or unconsolidated democracies. We
note this point specifically because Jo and Simmons’ recent
quantitative study examining the ICC’s deterrent effect advanced
an argument about social deterrence. Those scholars argue that
the ICC deters socially “because it mobilizes the international
community as well as domestic civil society to demand justice.”131
Their hypothesis is that state actors, as opposed to rebels, are
those most likely to be influenced by complementary social
sanctions.132 State actors should want to be viewed as legitimate
by the domestic public or the international community—a
community they may depend on for aid or trade.133 Since they
want to be viewed as legitimate, these state actors are also more
likely to be responsive to domestic and international pressures to
cease committing international crimes.134
While we do not disagree with Jo and Simmons that some
state actors can be socially deterred, we again argue for more
nuance and “unpacking.” We expect that state actors who are in
a position to manipulate the system will either not find such
131

Jo & Simmons, supra note 38, at 469.
Id. at 452–55.
133
Id. at 452–70.
134
Jo and Simmons tested their deterrence argument on a dependent variable
measuring “the number of civilians killed intentionally by government forces or rebel
groups in a direct military confrontation.” Id. at 456. The study produced evidence
that state actors were legally and socially deterred. Id. at 469–70. In states that
ratified the Rome Statute, a larger domestic presence of human rights organizations
was associated with a decrease in intentional killings by government actors. Id. at
463–64. At the international level of social sanctions, the results also showed that
“governments that ratified the ICC Statute were subsequently much more likely to
reduce or refrain from intentional civilian violence the more aid they received.” Id. at
464–65.
132
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pressures compelling or will be able to “hide under the radar”
because they control the machinery that would expose their own
abuses. This is so even if the state has substantial international
financial relationships and a domestic civil society pushing a
“justice” agenda. Indeed, for leaders in non-democracies and
unconsolidated democracies, the benefit of holding on to power or
obtaining power may be so great that it outweighs any potential
costs related to legal or social shaming—even if that shaming
might result in the country receiving less foreign aid.
The table below sets out our expectations regarding the
ICC’s likely deterrent effect taking into account various factors
that we argue could make the ICC more or less likely to produce
a deterrent effect.
Table 1: ICC Deterrent Effect Expectations

Democracy

NonDemocracy
or
Unconsolidated
Democracy

Low Level
ICC
Intervention
(e.g.,
Ratification)

Higher Level
ICC
Intervention
(e.g.,
Preliminary
Examination)

State ensures it
has good
human rights
practices and
institutions to
punish
violations
domestically
No significant
deterrent effect
because threat
of prosecution
seems low

State ensures it
has good human
rights practices
and institutions
to punish
violations
domestically
More significant
deterrent effect
because threat of
prosecution has
become more
real/but also risk
of perverse effect
if investigations
focus on state
leaders who may
commit human
rights abuses to
gain or maintain

Highest Level
of ICC
Intervention
(e.g.,
Prosecution
of State
Leaders)
State ensures it
has good
human rights
practices and
institutions to
punish
violations
domestically
More
significant
deterrent effect
because threat
of prosecution
is very real/but
also risk of
perverse effect
if prosecution
focuses on state
leaders who
control state
machinery that

2017]

DETERRENT EFFECT OF THE ICC
power

135
could be used to
commit human
rights abuses to
maintain power
and avoid ICC
prosecution

III. THE KENYA CASE STUDY: METHODOLOGY AND SELECTION
A.

Methodology

We test our hypotheses about the various factors that may
make the ICC more or less likely to produce a deterrent effect
using a case study of Kenya and its relationship with the ICC
over time. We also use this opportunity to test the social
deterrence theory advanced by Jo and Simmons. The Kenya case
study, like all case studies, enables the researcher to produce
context-dependent knowledge and experience to lead to a deeper
understanding of the subject matter being studied.135 Through
this case study, we trace the behavior of Kenya and particular
individuals within the state relevant to whether and under what
circumstances the ICC’s intervention has produced a positive or
negative deterrent effect.
Our study draws on documentary evidence obtained from
government, NGO, news, and scholarly sources, among others.
Unique to this case study of Kenya is that it also draws on novel
data collected during semi-structured interviews conducted in
Nairobi, Kenya during July, August and October 2015 with
various high-level subjects, including former government
officials, media persons, academics, and leaders in civil society,
and think-tanks. A local civil society organization with extensive
experience working on peace and conflict transformation in
Kenya, NPI-Africa,136 facilitated the interviews and helped us
identify individuals who would have significant knowledge about
(1) Kenya’s history as it relates to human rights abuses and
impunity; (2) the 2007 post-election violence; (3) Kenya’s
interaction with the ICC over time; (4) the facts surrounding

135
See BENT FLYVBJERG, FIVE MISUNDERSTANDINGS ABOUT CASE STUDY
RESEARCH, in QUALITATIVE RESEARCH PRACTICE 391–92 (Clive Seale, Giampietro
Gobo, Jaber F. Gubrium, & David Silverman, eds., 2d ed. 2004).
136
For more information, see NPI-AFRICA, http://www.npi-africa.org (last visited
Aug. 8, 2017).
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Kenya’s 2013 election campaign; and (5) the individuals who
were named ICC suspects. We did not confine our selection of
interviewees to any one specific political or ethnic affiliation.
Our interviewees varied as to their political and ethnic
allegiances. As such, this study benefits from the unique insights
of Kenyans with on-the-ground knowledge and the ability to
observe events from within a cultural milieu unfamiliar to
foreigners.
We conducted a total of 25 such high-level interviews—18
representatives from civil society and think tanks, 2 from the
media, 2 former politicians and 3 from academia—while on
location in Kenya. Each interview lasted between one and four
hours. Because of the sensitivity of the topics addressed during
the interviews, we promised to protect the confidentiality of the
interviewees’ information by not linking it to any specific person
in any reports or publications. Also to protect confidentiality and
enable interviewees to speak freely, we agreed to meet
interviewees in the location of their choice. To conduct the
interviews, we used an interview guide with prepared questions,
but the interviews were semi-structured so as to allow the
interviewees to narrate without being too constrained.137
As noted, isolating cause is a difficult task, made more
difficult by the presence of other factors that could also have
influenced particular behavioral change.
Nevertheless, our
interviews show how informed actors on the ground perceive the
ICC’s deterrent effect under varying circumstances and over
time. Combined with documentary data about what happened in
Kenya before and after it ratified the Rome Statute, the result is
a new model for evaluating and understanding the ICC’s
deterrent power.
B.

Case Selection

We chose Kenya to test our hypotheses and from which to
seek evidence of the ICC’s deterrent effect—and any unintended
or perverse effect—for several reasons. First, the country joined
137
We provided all interviewees with an informed consent statement before
interviewing them that advised them, among other things, that participation in the
interview was voluntary and that they could terminate their participation, or refuse
to answer questions, at any time. The informed consent statement also advised
interviewees that we would keep their identity confidential and not refer to them by
name in any report or publication.
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the ICC in 2005 despite a history of poor human rights
practices,138 as well as weak and corrupt domestic legal
In fact, Jomo Kenyatta, the country’s first
institutions.139
president after independence, and Daniel arap Moi, who ruled
the country for 24 years after Kenyatta’s death in 1978, have
both been accused of using state resources to favor their own
people and marginalize other ethnic groups. Both have also been
accused of committing human rights abuses to aid them in
maintaining power with impunity.140 Abuses by those in power
continued after the country introduced multi-party elections in
1991;141 leaders instrumentally incited violence between ethnic
groups142 in their quest for power.143 Moi provoked ethnic
violence in order to influence voting patterns so that he could win

138
See, e.g., Stephen Brown & Chandra Lekha Sriram, The Big Fish Won’t Fry
Themselves: Criminal Accountability for Post-Election Violence in Kenya, 111 AFR.
AFFS. 244, 247–49 (2012) (describing Kenya’s outbreaks of election-related violence
since 1991 when the country began permitting multi-party elections and the absence
of government prosecutions to hold any high-level perpetrators of the ethnic/political
violence accountable); Susanne D. Mueller, The Political Economy of Kenya’s Crisis,
2 J. E. AFR. STUD. 185, 187–93 (2008) (describing how Kenyan politicians have
employed violence to aid them in obtaining power and repressing opposition politics).
139
See Philip Alston, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial,
Summary or Arbitrary Executions, ¶ 23, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/11/2/Add.6 (May 26,
2009).
140
See, e.g., Marcel Rutten & Sam Owuor, Weapons of Mass Destruction: Land,
Ethnicity and the 2007 Elections in Kenya, 27 J. CONTEMP. AFR. STUD. 305, 313
(2009) (noting that several influential politicians were detained or killed during
Kenyatta’s administration); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, KENYA’S UNFINISHED
DEMOCRACY: A HUMAN RIGHTS AGENDA FOR THE NEW GOVERNMENT 1–4, 7–8 (2002)
(stating that Moi’s 24 years as Kenya’s autocratic leader were characterized by
endemic corruption, human rights abuses, and excessive use of force by the state)
[hereinafter HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, KENYA’S UNFINISHED DEMOCRACY].
141
Forced by domestic and international pressures, in 1991, Moi finally repealed
a controversial clause of the constitution that made his party, KANU (the Kenyan
African National Union), the sole political party by law. See Susanne D. Mueller,
Dying To Win: Elections, Political Violence, and Institutional Decay in Kenya, 29 J.
CONTEMP. AFR. STUD. 99, 103 (2011) (noting that Moi decided to accept a multiparty
system after international financial and local pressures) [hereinafter Mueller, Dying
to Win]; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, DIVIDE AND RULE: STATE-SPONSORED ETHNIC
VIOLENCE IN KENYA 9 (1993) (explaining that civil society organizations demanded
the end of a one-party state which in turn prompted international donors to suspend
foreign aid) [hereinafter HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, DIVIDE AND RULE].
142
Kenya has over forty different ethnic groups. The three largest are the
Kikuyu (20%), the Luhya (14%), and Luo (13%). Smaller groups include Kalenjin
(11%), Kamba (11%), Kisii (6%) and the Meru (5.5%). See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH,
KENYA’S UNFINISHED DEMOCRACY, supra note 140, at 5; see also The Crisis in
Kenya, INTERNATIONAL COALITION FOR THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT,
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the presidency in both 1992 and 1997.144 The 1992 violence
resulted in the deaths of some 1,500 people and the displacement
of more than 300,000.145 The 1997 violence resulted in between
70 and 100 people dead and about 200,000 displaced.146
The historical record also shows that after election violence
damps down in Kenya, impunity is the order of the day. After
the 1992 violence, and in response to calls for investigations from
opposition and church groups, Moi authorized a parliamentary
committee to investigate. Although the committee concluded
that politicians associated with Moi were responsible for
organizing and funding the violence, no one was ever held
accountable.147 After the 1997 violence, Moi again established a
committee. He tasked the Akiwumi Commission of Inquiry to
investigate “tribal clashes” that have occurred since 1991, the
origins and underlying causes of the clashes, responses of the
police and other law enforcement agencies to these incidents, and
the “level of preparedness and the effectiveness of law
enforcement agencies” in controlling and preventing such
clashes.148 That Commission issued a report in 1999, but because
the government objected, the report was not made public until
2002. The Akiwumi Commission concluded that members of
Moi’s ruling party had incited violence and later frustrated
investigations.149 As before, however, the government did not

http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/crises/crisis-in-kenya#1 (last visited
Aug. 8, 2017).,
143
See Sabine Höhn, New Start or False Start? The ICC and Electoral Violence
in Kenya, 45 DEV. AND CHANGE 565, 568 (2014) (noting that election periods became
more violent after political liberalization and the introduction of multiparty system);
see also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, DIVIDE AND RULE, supra note 141, at 1; Lawrence
Gitonga Mwongera, Making Sense of Political-Related Violence in Kenya, OPEN
SECURITY (Sept. 14, 2012), https://www.opendemocracy.net/opensecurity/lawrencegitonga-mwongera/making-sense-of-political-related-violence-in-kenya.
144
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, KENYA’S UNFINISHED DEMOCRACY, supra note 140,
at 5–6; Mwongera, supra note 143.
145
See Höhn, supra note 143, at 568; Brown & Sriram, supra note 138, at 247.
146
See Höhn, supra note 143, at 568.
147
See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, PLAYING THE “COMMUNAL CARD”: COMMUNAL
VIOLENCE AND HUMAN RIGHTS, 106 (1995) [hereinafter HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH,
COMMUNAL CARD].
148
JUDICIAL COMMISSION OF INQUIRY INTO TRIBAL CLASHES IN KENYA, REPORT
OF THE JUDICIAL COMMISSION APPOINTED TO INQUIRE INTO TRIBAL CLASHES IN
KENYA iii (2002), http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/related_material/Akiwumi
%20Report.pdf.
149
See id.
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hold any perpetrators accountable for their roles in the
violence.150
It is true that the 2002 elections that led to Mwai Kibaki
assuming the presidency were not accompanied by any
The promised democratic reforms,
significant violence.151
however, did not materialize despite Kibaki’s campaign promises.
Human Rights Watch states that few reforms had been
implemented as of 2008.152 A 2009 Human Rights Council Report
characterized Kenya’s judicial system as “slow and corrupt.”153 In
fact, the evidence suggests that democracy in Kenya was not
consolidated by the time of the 2007 post-election violence.
Mueller argues that one of the root causes of that violence was
that Kenya remained characterized by “deliberately weak
institutions, mostly overridden by a highly personalized and
centralized presidency, that could and did not exercise the
autonomy or checks and balances normally associated with
democracies. . . .”154
For all of these reasons, Kenya is a country that could
improve its human rights practices and protections against such
abuses at the time it joined the ICC and thereafter. By joining
the court, Kenya committed itself to address mass atrocities and
increased the possibility that its citizens would be subjected to an
ICC prosecution and increased a risk to its sovereignty—risking
that its citizens would be prosecuted in The Hague should they
commit mass atrocities or should Kenya fail to prosecute
perpetrators on its own. To avoid this fate, Kenya could improve
(1) behaviors and practices related to the incidence of mass
atrocities or other human rights abuses and (2) its institutional

150

See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, BALLOTS TO BULLETS, supra note 16, at 18–19.
One reason for the absence of significant ethnic tensions during the 2002
elections is that both presidential candidates were from the Kikuyu community.
Stefan Dercon & Roxana Gutiérrez-Romero, Triggers and Characteristics of the 2007
Kenyan Electoral Violence, 40 WORLD DEV. 731, 733 (2012).
152
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, BALLOTS TO BULLETS, supra note 16, at 12.
153
See Alston, supra note 139, ¶ 23, 16–17.
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Mueller, Dying to Win, supra note 141, at 186. Data from the Worldwide
Governance Indicators Database shows that Kenya has had low rule of law and
control of corruption scores relative to other countries in the world between 1996
and 2013. Rule of law scores hover in the 20th to 30th percentile rank. Control of
corruption scores hover within the 10th and 20th percentile rank. See Worldwide
Governance Indicators: Country Data Report for Kenya 1996-2013, THE WORLD
BANK, http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/worldwide-governance-indicators (last
visited Aug. 8, 2017).
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mechanisms to enable it to respond to such crimes should they
occur. Countries with already good practices and institutions
offer less of an opportunity to find evidence of the ICC’s deterrent
effect because those countries have less room for improvement
and less of a reason to fear that their citizens might become the
subject of an ICC prosecution.
Second, because the named suspects in the Kenya cases
included state actors—including Uhuru Kenyatta, the country’s
sitting president as of March 2013—this case study provides an
opportunity to seek out and analyze evidence of how those in
power or those seeking a hold in power respond to an ICC
intervention.
Finally, Kenya is one of only a handful of countries where
the ICC has specifically intervened by way of a formal ICC
investigation and prosecution.155 This is the ICC’s highest level
of intervention—higher than the preliminary examination phase
that precedes it.
According to the OTP, it conducts a
“preliminary examination” of all situations that come to its
attention to “decide whether there is a reasonable basis to
initiate an investigation.”156 With Kenya, however, the OTP
eventually opened a formal investigation, which meant that it
had to convince the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber that there was a
reasonable basis to initiate a formal investigation.157 That the
ICC has intervened in Kenya with an investigation and
prosecution of suspects suggests that there should be more
available evidence to aid in making inferences about whether and
under what circumstances the ICC is more or less likely to
produce a deterrent effect.

155
See Situations Under Investigation, supra note 87, for a list of the 9 different
situations in which the ICC has commenced investigations and prosecutions.
156
The legal criteria the OTP assesses during the preliminary examination
phase include (1) if the crimes were committed after the Rome Statute came into
effect, (2) if the crimes took place on the territory of a State Party or were committed
by nationals of a State Party; (3) whether the crimes committed constitute war
crimes, crimes against humanity or genocide; (4) the gravity of these crimes;
(5) whether the State Party has commenced any genuine investigations and
prosecutions of the same crimes domestically; and (6) whether opening an ICC
investigation would serve the interests of justice and of the victims. See Office of the
Prosecutor, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, https://www.icc-cpi.int/about/otp?ln=
en (last visited Aug. 8, 2017).
157
See Situation in the Republic of Kenya, Case No. ICC-01/09, Decision
Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorization of an Investigation
into the Situation in the Republic of Kenya, ¶¶ 17–69 (Mar. 31, 2010).
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IV. UNPACKING THE ICC’S DETERRENT EFFECT
This section examines documentary and interview evidence
in an effort to unpack the ICC’s deterrent effect for evidence of
whether and in what circumstances the court is more or less
likely to deter. The specific objectives are to determine (1)
whether the ICC has led to a reduction of mass atrocities or other
human rights abuses and (2) whether the ICC has led to an
increase in domestic protections available to punish those who
commit such crimes. Our analysis proceeds chronologically so as
to map the behavior of state actors, in particular those targeted
by the ICC over time and in relation to the level of the ICC’s
intervention in the country. By proceeding chronologically, we
can take note of significant events occurring in Kenya relative to
mass atrocities, human rights abuses, and domestic law
enforcement mechanisms to punish such abuses. We can also
take note of the level of the ICC’s intervention, which we argue is
related to assessing the cost side of the rational cost-benefit
calculation.
The case study analysis is divided into several sections, each
of which is characterized by a different level of ICC intervention.
First, we focus on the period of time when the ICC intervention
consists solely of Kenya’s ratification.158 That period runs from
when Kenya ratified the Rome Statute in 2005 up to the 2007
post-election violence. The second time period represents an
increase in the ICC’s level of intervention, when it is conducting
a preliminary examination and considering charges. That time
period runs from the immediate aftermath of the 2007 postelection violence until March 2010 when an ICC Pre-Trial
Chamber authorized the prosecutor to commence a formal
investigation into the Kenyan situation. The third period of time
corresponds with the ICC’s formal investigation and prosecution
of the Kenyan suspects. We chose December 2014 as the cut-off
date for this period because by that time, the ICC prosecutor
announced her decision to suspend the case against President
Kenyatta. Arguably after December 2014, the level of the ICC’s
intervention was not as high—or perceived to be as high—as
158
We characterize “ratification” as a level of intervention even though
ratification does not involve specific oversight or action by the ICC’s OTP. In this
case, the intervention exists because by joining, the state has legally committed to
the court, thereby putting itself and its citizens at greater risk of an ICC prosecution
than those of non-ratifying states.
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when it was proceeding against six, or even four, suspects. After
all, the prosecutor’s stated reason for dropping the case against
Kenyatta was because Kenya and its leaders had allegedly
succeeded in obstructing the ICC’s ability to obtain evidence and
convince witnesses to testify at trial.
Finally, we briefly discuss a final time period: after
December 2014 when the ICC proceeded only in its case against
Deputy President, William Ruto, and radio journalist, Joshua
Sang. This discussion is brief because our data collection in
Kenya ended in October 2015 when the case against the two
defendants was still unfolding. At that time, the facts on-theground as between the ICC and Kenya were subject to change,
making it exceptionally difficult to make any conclusive
statement about deterrent effects or a lack thereof. Further, our
interviewees only shared information and opinions they formed
on the basis of information available and known up to October
2015.
A.

Ratification Until the 2007 Post-Election Violence

1.

Assessing the ICC’s Legal Deterrent Effect in Kenya at the
Ratification Level of Intervention

Given Kenya’s history of poor human rights practices, elitedriven election violence, and impunity, Kenya’s decision to join
the ICC in 2005 is somewhat surprising. After all, countries with
such characteristics are most likely to face the risk that their
citizens will be tried in The Hague. To avoid such a fate, Kenya
would have to make a break from its past and improve its
practices and institutions so as to avoid such a sovereignty loss.
The fact of Kenya’s ICC treaty ratification, however, does not
seem to have produced such a deterrent effect: during this time
period, the evidence does not show a (1) reduction in mass
atrocities or other human rights abuses or (2) an increase in
domestic protections available to hold perpetrators of such crimes
accountable.
First, the evidence does not indicate that ICC ratification
influenced Kenya to reduce the incidence of mass atrocities or
other human rights abuses. Instead, it shows that only two years
after ratification, the country was immersed in mass violence.
Nor was this a different kind of mass violence than Kenya had
previously experienced. Once again, political elites incited the

2017]

DETERRENT EFFECT OF THE ICC

143

violence and pitted different ethnicities against each other for the
purposes of gaining or maintaining power.
In particular, on the evening of December 30, 2007, the
Electoral Commission of Kenya announced that Mwai Kibaki had
won the presidency, a somewhat surprising result given that preelection polls had indicated his opponent, Raila Odinga, held a
substantial lead.159 Kibaki hastily had himself sworn in as
president, while Odinga urged his supporters to protest against a
“stolen election.”160 Thereafter, Kenya rapidly plunged into interethnic violence. Supporters of Odinga, predominantly Luo and
Kalenjin, attacked Kibaki’s Kikuyu supporters. The Kikuyu
retaliated. According to a report issued after the violence
concluded, politicians and business people planned and
orchestrated much of the violence by enlisting the support of
criminal gangs, such as the Mungiki, to carry out attacks.161 The
violence left at least 1,000 people dead and approximately
500,000 displaced over a two-month period.162
Nor does the evidence show that ICC ratification prompted
Kenya to improve its domestic mechanisms available to punish
those who commit such crimes. First, Kenya did not implement
the ICC crimes into its domestic legislation until January 2009,
through the 2008 International Crimes Act.163 Second, during
this time period, the government did not implement any
significant democratic reforms that would further independent
investigations and prosecutions of mass atrocities or other
human rights abuses. According to a Human Rights Watch
Report, the Kibaki government’s one notable and positive step
was establishing the Kenya National Commission on Human

159

Höhn, supra note 143, at 567.
See Jeffrey Steeves, Democracy Unravelled in Kenya: Multi-Party
Competition and Ethnic Targeting, 9 AFR. IDENTITIES 455, 456 (2011); see also
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, BALLOTS TO BULLETS, supra note 16, at 21–23 (noting that
international observer missions issued statements condemning the tallying results
and casting doubt on the conclusion that Kibaki had won the election).
161
See COMMISSION OF INQUIRY INTO POST ELECTION VIOLENCE, COMMISSION
OF INQUIRY INTO THE POST ELECTION VIOLENCE (CIPEV) REPORT 347 (2008),
http://www.kenyalaw.org/Downloads/Reports/Commission_of_Inquiry_into_Post_Ele
ction_Violence.pdf [hereinafter Waki Commission Report].
162
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, BALLOTS TO BULLETS, supra note 16, at 21–23.
163
Kenya began the process of adopting the Act in 2005, but it was only passed
in 2009 after the ICC prosecutor threatened to launch his investigation. Antonina
Okuta, National Legislation for Prosecution of International Crimes in Kenya, 7 J.
INT’L CRIM. JUST. 1063, 1065, 1072–73 (2009).
160
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Rights (“KNCHR”) in 2003, a genuinely independent institution
to act as a watchdog over the government.164 Notably, this was
before Kenya ratified the ICC. Otherwise, the report states that
“[i]n general . . . promises of reform were not fulfilled.”165 Rather,
the facts surrounding Kibaki’s proposed 2005 constitution show
Kibaki’s lack of commitment to democratic reform. Voters
rejected the 2005 constitution, because it failed to release
Kibaki’s stronghold on executive power.166 Afterwards, Kibaki
demonstrated his dissatisfaction with the vote, and his intention
to retain his stronghold on power, by dismissing his entire
cabinet.167 He replaced the cabinet with individuals who were
mostly “old friends and colleagues.”168
In sum, the evidence indicates that ratification—the lowest
level of ICC intervention—did not produce a deterrent effect in
Kenya. While we cannot know with absolute certainly why this
is the case, the evidence shows that during this time, Kenyans
greatly discounted the ICC’s threat, and the cost side of any
rational cost-benefit calculation.169 Statements from interviewees
support this interpretation. Several interviewees, including
former government advisors, said that at the time they ratified
the Rome Statute, Kenya’s political leaders did not realize that
One interviewee
they could be brought to The Hague.170
indicated that Kenyans expected that the ICC “would just deal
with the worst of the worst. Many would not have viewed Kenya
164
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, BALLOTS TO BULLETS, supra note 16, at 11–12. The
KNCHR website contains additional information about the institution at KENYAN
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, http://www.knchr.org/Aboutus/Establ
ishment.aspx/ (last visited Aug. 8, 2017).
165
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, BALLOTS TO BULLETS, supra note 16, at 12.
166
See Kenya: Country Report (2006), FREEDOMHOUSE.ORG, https://freedomho
use.org/report/freedom-world/2006/kenya (last visited Aug. 8, 2017); see also
MICHELA WRONG, IT’S OUR TURN TO EAT: THE STORY OF A KENYAN WHISTLEBLOWER 243 (2009).
167
See, e.g., WRONG, supra note 166, at 243–44; Kenya’s Entire Cabinet
Dismissed, BBC NEWS (Nov. 23, 2005, 6:34 PM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/
4463262.stm.
168
Defiant Kibaki Swears in Cabinet, PAMBAZUKA NEWS (Dec. 8, 2005),
https://www.pambazuka.org/governance/defiant-kibaki-swears-cabinet.
169
Susanne Mueller reaches a similar conclusion. She notes that when Kenya
ratified the ICC treaty, the court was still in “its infancy.” Moreover, the political
situation in Kenya seemed to be improving, such that many would have thought it
inconceivable that any Kenyan would ever be charged by the ICC. Susanne D.
Mueller, Kenya and the International Criminal Court: Politics, the Election, and the
Law, 8 J. E. AFR. STUD. 25, 29 (2014) [hereinafter Mueller, Kenya and the ICC].
170
Interview with Subject 591, 898.
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as a candidate for the court at the time as there were far worse
things going on in other countries in Africa, and Kenya was at
that time optimistic about its future and democracy.”171 An
interviewee from civil society noted that by signing the Rome
Statute Kenya would appear to be progressive.172
The
interviewee added that signing certain treaties would not only
suggest a strong human rights record in the country, but would
also bring other benefits such as donor funding.173 Another
interviewee stated: “Kenya is used to signing international
agreements for prestige, rather than content.”174
Evidence from parliamentary debates from 2001175 and
2003176 supports this same conclusion: The record indicates that
Kenyan politicians were not terribly concerned with the risks of
ratifying the Rome Statute.177 Parliamentary discussions in 2001
focused on the issue of ratification and how Kenya might
implement the Statute. In fact, in response to the question
whether “the Government fears that the ICC may try people
amongst its ranks as it has done to Mr. Slobodan Milosevic and
General Pinochet,” then-Attorney General, Amos Wako, indicated
a lack of concern, stating that Kenya was committed to ratifying
He elaborated by saying that “the
the Rome Statute.178
government [of Kenya] has been one of the most active
participants at the Preparatory Commission’s meetings in New
York.”179 A review of the 2003 parliamentary debates show that
Kenyan leaders were still intent on ratifying, but concerned

171

Interview with Subject 333.
Interview with Subject 582.
173
Interview with Subject 582.
174
Interview with Subject 444.
175
National Assembly, KENYA NATIONAL ASSEMBLY OFFICIAL RECORD
(HANSARD), 3094 (Nov. 14, 2001) (indicating that the Kenyan government is
committed to ratifying the Rome Statute and stressed that Kenya took an active
part during the Rome Conference).
176
National Assembly, KENYA NATIONAL ASSEMBLY OFFICIAL RECORD
(HANSARD), 2674 (Oct. 1, 2003) (discussing a request from the U.S. government to
sign a bilateral agreement addressing the exclusion of arrest and hand-over of U.S.
nationals to the ICC).
177
See also Mueller, Kenya and the ICC, supra note 169, at 29 (stating that “[i]n
the parliamentary debates of the time and among civil society activists, one finds no
concern that any Kenyans would ever be hauled before the ICC,” the focus instead
being on, among other things, “reconciling the parts of the Kenyan constitution that
gave immunity to the president”).
178
National Assembly, supra note 175, at 3094.
179
Id.
172
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about how to deal with the request from the United States to sign
a bilateral immunity agreement promising not to surrender U.S.
personnel to the ICC.180
These views indicating that Kenya did not believe the ICC
posed a great threat at the time make sense when one considers
the context. Recall that the ICC was a new institution that had
been operating for only a few years when Kenya ratified the
Rome Statute. Further, in those years the prosecutor had relied
on self-referrals, except for the Security Council’s referral of the
situation in Darfur, Sudan.181 Moreover, those cases involved
collapsed or transitioning states in the midst of raging civil
wars.182 Finally, Kenya’s history as a non-democracy with a
culture of impunity also likely figured as part of the calculus in
assessing the ICC’s threat—and the cost side of the rational costbenefit calculation. As described above, leaders in Kenya were
used to “getting away” with their crimes: They had not faced,
and did not expect to face, judicial sanctions. Individuals we
interviewed made similar points. For example, one interviewee
said: “Moi was an awful president, but now he goes around
celebrated.”183 The interviewee added, “There is no record of
justice in Kenya.”184 Another interviewee noted that prior to the
post-election violence in 2007 “there was a lot of impunity” and
“anyone could perpetrate anything before the ICC got
involved.”185
2.

Assessing the Social Deterrent Effect

Even if the evidence does not suggest evidence of legal
deterrence during this time period, we look for evidence of a
social deterrent effect in order to test the hypotheses and
findings of Jo and Simmons. Based on their quantitative large-N
study, they concluded that the ICC produces a social deterrent
effect on state actors, more so than rebels, because state actors
are most likely to be responsive to international and domestic
180

Mueller, Kenya and the ICC, supra note 169, at 29.
See Situations Under Investigation, supra note 87.
182
See Thomas Obel Hansen, The International Criminal Court in Kenya: Three
Defining Features of a Contested Accountability Process and Their Implications for
the Future of International Justice, 18 AUSTL. J. HUM. RTS. 187, 198 (2012)
(referencing the ICC cases in Uganda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo).
183
Interview with Subject 417.
184
Id.
185
Interview with Subject 349.
181
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pressures to conform their behavior to acceptable norms. We,
however, find little evidence that Kenya’s government actors
were socially deterred during this time period, despite the fact
that Kenya had important relationships with the international
community and an increasingly activist civil society.
During this time period, Kenya was integrated into the
international community with trade and aid relationships.
According to data maintained by the World Bank, between 2005
and 2007 Kenya received a total of approximately US $3 billion
in official aid.186 Such amounts easily put Kenya amongst the
upper echelons of those receiving aid. In fact, in 2005 alone,
Kenya gave up US $9.8 million in military aid when it refused to
succumb to United States’ pressure to sign a bilateral agreement
promising not to transfer any U.S. citizen to the ICC to be
prosecuted.187 Also, after Kibaki came into power, Kenya had a
growing civil society sector.188 That sector played a role in
pushing for ICC ratification.189
Nevertheless, the evidence demonstrates that the country’s
leaders once again instrumentally employed violence in their
quest for power after the results of the 2007 presidential
elections were announced. Nor did Kenya make any remarkable
strides in terms of domestic protections against human rights
abuses during this time period. While causal inferences always
come with disclaimers, the evidence does not suggest that Kenya
was significantly influenced during this time period by any
international or domestic social shaming to significantly improve
its domestic practices to avoid the specter of an ICC prosecution.

186
See Net Official Development Assistance and Official Aid Received, THE
WORLD BANK, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/DT.ODA.ALLD.CD?page=1 (last
visited Aug. 8, 2017).
187
See Fred Oluoch, Kenya: Will Kibaki Succumb to U.S. Pressure?, NEW
AFRICAN, Aug–Sept. 2005, at 27 (noting that Kenya was risking U.S. $9.8 million in
military aid); Press Release, CICC, Global Coalition Voices Support for Kenya’s OnGoing Resistance to U.S. ICC Immunity Agreement: Kenya’s Firm Stand in
Defending ICC Integrity is Welcomed by International NGOs (July 20, 2005),
http://archive.iccnow.org/documents/KenyaresistBIA_pr.pdf (praising Kenya for
refusing to sign the bilateral agreement).
188
For example, in 2003, Kenya established the Kenya National Commission on
Human Rights. The Human Rights Act, KENYA NATIONAL COMMISSION ON HUMAN
RIGHTS, http://knchr.org/HumanRights/ThehumanrightsAct.aspx (last visited Aug.
4, 2017).
189
See, e.g., DUTTON, supra note 81, at 143 (stating that Kenya joined the court
in 2005 after an international and civil society campaign encouraging membership).
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B.

Immediate Aftermath of the 2007 Post-Election Violence Until
the March 2010 Authorization to Commence a Formal
Investigation

1.

Assessing the ICC’s Legal Deterrent Effect at the
Preliminary Examination Level of Intervention

After the post-election violence and until the court
authorized the prosecutor to commence a formal investigation
into the Kenyan situation, Kenya became the subject of an ICC
preliminary examination—a higher level of intervention than
ratification alone.190 The evidence, however, is mixed as to
whether the ICC’s preliminary examination intervention
produced a legal deterrent effect. Some evidence suggests (1) a
reduction in the incidence of mass atrocities or human rights
abuses and (2) an increase in domestic mechanisms for holding
perpetrators of such crimes accountable. On the other hand, not
all of the evidence on either front is positive.
First, as to Kenya’s human rights practices, the post-election
violence ended by February 2008, and the country did not
experience any repeat of mass violence during the ICC’s
preliminary examination period. The absence of mass violence is
certainly an improvement. However, whether this improvement
actually came about through the Kenyan government’s
commitment to protecting against mass atrocities and human
rights abuses can be questioned. Also during this time period,
some evidence shows that individuals who could ostensibly be
witnesses in any prosecution of perpetrators of the post-election
violence were allegedly being killed or disappeared. The ICC
prosecutor has charged that during 2008 and 2009, Kenyatta had
members of the Mungiki gang killed “in order to cover up his
involvement with them and through them in the post-election
violence.”191 These allegations have not been proven beyond a
reasonable doubt, though Mungiki members have disappeared or
been found dead. In March 2008, the wife of one Mungiki leader

190
See, e.g., Press Release, ICC OTP, Prosecutor Receives Materials on Postelection Violence in Kenya (July 16, 2009), https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/item.
aspx?name=pr438 (noting that Kenya had been the subject of an ICC preliminary
examination since February 2008).
191
Walter Menya, Shocking: Uhuru ‘Killed’ All Mungiki Witnesses Says ICC
Prosecutor Bensouda, KENYA TODAY (Aug. 2, 2014), http://www.kenya-today.com/n
ews/uhuru-kenyatta-killed-mungiki-witnesses-says-icc-prosecutor-bensouda.
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was murdered.192
A few months later, Mungiki’s Nairobi
Coordinator was killed. According to the ICC prosecutor, two
Mungiki leaders arrested by police in April and June of 2008,
respectively, are presumed dead. A Mungiki leader in Naivasha
arrested by police in May 2009 is also presumed dead.193 On the
day of the OTP’s request to open an investigation into the
Kenyan situation, another prominent member of the Mungiki
was killed.194
What, though, does the evidence suggest may have been the
role of the ICC in producing the absence of violence after
February 2008? Our analysis indicates that the ICC’s role was
small as compared to the role of the international and domestic
communities. As of February 2008, the ICC had only issued one
statement saying it was watching Kenya.195 The international
and domestic communities, by contrast, were actively engaged
during February 2008 in taking steps to end the violence. The
international community intervened in early February 2008 to
establish a mediation process, the Kenyan National Dialogue and
Reconciliation (“KNDR”) process, led by former SecretaryGeneral of the United Nations, Kofi Annan.196 The mediation led
by Annan concluded on February 28, 2008 with the
announcement of a National Accord197 and an agreement to form

192
Cyrus Ombati, Kenya: Mungiki Leader’s Wife Executed, THE EAST AFRICAN
STANDARD (NAIROBI) (Apr. 12, 2008), http://allafrica.com/stories/200804111177.html.
193
Who Planned Naivasha PEV Murder Attacks of January 2008?, ALLAFRICA:
THE HAGUE TRIALS KENYA (Apr. 16, 2015, 2:04 PM), http://allafrica.com/stories/2015
04171235.html.
194
Kamore Maina, Mungiki Witness Reveals Why He Quit Uhuru Case, THE
STAR (KENYA) (Dec. 23, 2013 12:00 AM), http://www.the-star.co.ke/news/2013/12/23/
mungiki-witness-reveals-why-he-quit-uhuru-case_c874373; Caspar Waithaka &
John Ngirachu, Mungiki Leader Killed in Nairobi, DAILY NATION (Nov. 5, 2009),
http://www.nation.co.ke/news/-/1056/682504/-/4cjm1fz/-/index.html.
195
ICC OTP, OTP Statement in Relation to Events in Kenya (Feb. 5, 2008),
https://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/1BB89202-16AE-4D95-ABBB4597C416045D/0/ICCOTPST20080205ENG.pdf
196
See Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation: One Year Later, KOFI
ANNAN FOUNDATION (Mar. 28, 2009), http://kofiannanfoundation.org/our-work/
kenya-national-dialogue-and-reconciliation.
197
The Accord included important agreements on four main agenda items:
(1) take immediate action to stop the violence and restore fundamental rights and
liberties; (2) resolve the humanitarian crisis, promote reconciliation, heal, and
restore calm; (3) overcome the political crisis; (4) and address long-term issues.
SOUTH CONSULTING, THE KENYA NATIONAL DIALOGUE AND RECONCILIATION
(KNDR) MONITORING PROJECT (2009), http://katibainstitute.org/Archives/images/
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a coalition government, with Kibaki acting as President and
Odinga as Prime Minister.198 When Annan announced the
power-sharing deal in late February 2008, Kibaki and Odinga
urged their supporters to stop fighting and respect the
arrangement.199 During February 2008, civil society was also
pressing for an end to the violence, having organized themselves
under the umbrella group “Concerned Citizens for Peace”
(“CCP”). The CCP was active in getting the leadership of the
Orange Democratic Movement (“ODM”) and Party of National
Unity (“PNU”) to mediate and was behind invitations to some of
the prominent Africans to aid in mediation efforts.200
The evidence is similarly mixed regarding any increase in
Kenya’s domestic protections against human rights abuses. On a
positive note, as part of the mediation process following the postelection violence, the Kenyan government agreed to implement
institutional reforms, including judicial and constitutional
reforms.201 In July 2009, the government created a task force to
make specific recommendations on how to enhance the
The
effectiveness and independence of the judiciary.202
government also drafted a new constitution providing for checks
and balances on government power.203 Kenya adopted that new
constitution in August 2010.204 In addition, in 2009 Kenya

Monitoring%20and%20Evaluation%20Report%20on%20the%20National%20Accord.
pdf.
198
See Agreement on the Principles of Partnership of the Coalition Government
(Feb 28. 2008), http://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/KE_080228_
Acting%20Together%20for%20KenyaAgreement%20on%20the%20Principles%20of%
20Partnership%20of%20the%20Coalition%20Government.pdf.
199
See Jeffrey Gettleman, Kenya Rivals Reach Peace Agreement, N.Y. TIMES
(Feb. 29, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/29/world/africa/29kenya.html.
200
L. Muthoni Wanyeki, The International Criminal Court’s Cases in Kenya:
Origin and Impact, INST. SECURITY STUD., no. 237, Aug. 2012, at 5.
201
Kenya: Mediation is Making Progress - Kofi Annan, RELIEFWEB (Feb. 15,
2008), http://reliefweb.int/report/kenya/kenya-mediation-making-progress-kofi-anna
n.
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NANA EFFAH-APENTENG, ET AL., BACK FROM THE BRINK: THE 2008
MEDIATION PROCESS AND REFORMS IN KENYA 5 (2014), http://www.knchr.org/Portals
/0/GeneralReports/backFromBrink_web.pdf.
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See Mike Sunderland, Kofi Annan Warns of Return to Violence in Kenya,
VOA NEWS (Dec. 9, 2009, 4:58 AM), http://www.voanews.com/content/kofi-annanviolence-kenya-08dec09--78874397/416289.html
(noting
that
the
Kenyan
government released a draft of a new constitution to the public in November 2009).
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Jeffrey Gettleman, Kenyans Approve New Constitution, N.Y. Times (Aug. 5,
2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/06/world/africa/06kenya.html. For a copy of
Kenya’s 2010 constitution, see Constitution of Kenya, 2010, KENYA LAW,
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passed the International Crimes Act, which incorporated the
definition of international crimes from the ICC into its domestic
laws.205 This development is positive, as it means that Kenya can
then prosecute domestically any individuals who commit
genocide, crimes against humanity, or war crimes.
As above, the question then is what role, if any, did the ICC
play in producing these positive reforms? According to some of
our interviewees, the answer is that the 2010 constitution can, in
part, be attributed to ICC involvement. Interviewees stated that
government leaders may have pushed more for a new
constitution because they believed that it would help them
persuade the ICC to go away.206 One interviewee even argued
that the government rushed the constitution through in an
attempt to protect itself and its close allies from ICC
prosecution.207 And as discussed in more detail below, Kenya has
argued that the Kenyan cases were not admissible before the ICC
because the country had improved its own courts and was able to
try the suspects under the new International Crimes Act.208
On the negative side, although Kenya implemented some
institutional reforms on paper, the country did not alter its
previous practice of allowing impunity for mass atrocities. As
part of the mediation process following the post-election violence,
the Kenyan government established the Commission of Inquiry
to Investigate the Post-Election Violence (“CIPEV”), also known
as the Waki Commission.209 The Waki Commission released its
report in October 2008, wherein it recommended establishing a
Special Tribunal in Kenya with judges from Kenya and from the
international community to investigate and prosecute

http://www.kenyalaw.org/lex/actview.xql?actid=Const2010 (last visited Aug. 8,
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207
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209
The Waki Commission got its name after its Chair, Justice Philip Waki, a
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from the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Additionally, “[t]wo Kenyans, Mr. David
Majanja and Mr. George Kegoro, were appointed the Counsel Assisting the
Commission and Commission Secretary,” respectively. Waki Commission Report,
supra note 161, at 1.
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responsible individuals.210 The Kenyan government, however,
did not implement the Commission’s recommendations.211 It
never established a Special Tribunal, even though it was given
several extensions of the original deadline to do so.212 Nor did it
institute any other domestic proceedings to bring perpetrators to
justice.213 Finally, in late July 2009, the Kenyan government
issued a statement saying that the cabinet had rejected the idea
of setting up a Special Tribunal and decided instead to permit
the Truth Justice and Reconciliation Commission (“TJRC”) to
deal with perpetrators of the post-election violence.214
Kenya created the TJRC in 2008 as part of the process
immediately following the post-election violence.
The
Commission’s mandate, though, was to investigate abuses from
1963 onward. The TJRC has taken witness statements. As of
December 2014, the government had not implemented any of the
TJRC’s recommendations.215
Accordingly, during this preliminary examination phase, the
evidence still suggests that Kenya was not committed to holding
anyone accountable for the post-election violence. The evidence
also indicates that the country did not fear the ICC enough to
actually implement domestic processes to try those responsible

210
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for the violence in 2007 or 2008. This conclusion is consistent
with the views shared by some of our interviewees. Several
stated that before the ICC published the names of the suspects,
people saw the ICC as an empty threat and a court with no
teeth,216 referring to Ruto’s comment that “the court would take
some 90 years or more before it does anything.”217
In fact, the evidence shows that Kenya’s leaders may have
believed they could endlessly stall the ICC so that it would not
act. The ICC prosecutor repeatedly warned Kenyan leaders
during 2009 that impunity was not an option and that the ICC
would intervene if Kenya did not establish a Special Tribunal.218
The Kenyan government responded by repeatedly failing to
create the tribunal. Kenyan leaders also made promises that
they did not keep. In July 2009, Kenyan leaders told the ICC
prosecutor that they would self-refer the situation to the ICC in
the event that the Special Tribunal was not created.219 They
never did so, and the prosecutor instead used his proprio motu
powers—the prosecutor’s power in the Rome Statute to
commence cases on his own motion to the court without referral
from a State Party or the U.N. Security Council—to mount the
Kenya cases.220 Kibaki and Odinga also reportedly agreed that
any individuals named as ICC suspects would be expelled from
government. Yet they never forced any of the suspects out.221
On the other hand, Kenyan leaders may have viewed
creating a Special Tribunal as a move that could prove extremely
threatening to themselves and their allies. As Brown and Sriram
216
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state, “[W]hereas the Special Tribunal could prosecute hundreds
of suspects, the ICC could only pursue a half-dozen perpetrators
at the highest level.”222 Thus, before the ICC prosecutor named
suspects, some parliamentarians could reasonably believe the
ICC would not target them because they were not “big fish.”223 In
other words, the ICC might pose a threat to some individuals in
Kenya, but not to all of the parliamentarians who had to vote for
a bill to establish the Special Tribunal. Brown and Sriram argue
that some parliamentarians might have believed at that time
before names were revealed that the ICC could be “useful in
removing [their] political rivals.”224 A former executive director
of the Kenyan Human Rights Commission makes a similar point,
stating that parliamentarians voted down the Special Tribunal
because they only wanted accountability for their opponents, not
for members of their own political party.225
2.

Assessing the Social Deterrent Effect

During the ICC’s preliminary examination phase, the facts
show that both the international and domestic community were
calling for Kenya to end the post-election violence and introduce
reforms and other processes to ensure that perpetrators of the
violence were held accountable.
As described above, the
mediation process led by Kofi Annan and backed by the
international and domestic communities seems to have
contributed to the cessation of the violence and some
institutional reforms.
Still, Kenyan leaders ignored the numerous calls to end the
country’s cycle of impunity.
In December 2008, the U.S.
Ambassador to Kenya said that his government would welcome a
request to provide investigative experts for a Special Tribunal.226
In December 2009, Kofi Annan publicly complained about the
slow pace of reforms in Kenya to address the post-election
violence.227 Kenya’s section of the International Commission of
Jurists issued a letter in July 2009 urging Kenya to establish a
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Special Tribunal that would be beyond the reach of Kenya’s
Attorney General, who the jurists alleged uses his powers to keep
his political friends from being brought to justice in Kenya’s
domestic courts.228 In August 2009, Human Rights Watch called
for Kenya to immediately establish a Special Tribunal.229 The
Kenyan Civil Society has also complained about the cabinet’s
decision to abandon the process towards creating a Special
Tribunal.230
On the whole, then, there is a lack of evidence to support a
social deterrent effect during this time period because ultimately
Kenya did not embrace any of the proposed structural changes or
normative changes, such as new and more independent
institutions designed to enable it to hold perpetrators of the
violence accountable. Kenyan leaders refused to establish the
Special Tribunal. Moreover, Kenyan leaders did not embrace an
international accountability process; although Kenya agreed to
refer the situation to the ICC, its leaders did not do so.
C.

Naming of Suspects Until the ICC Prosecutor Suspends the
Case Against Kenyatta

1.

Assessing the ICC’s Legal Deterrent Effect at the
Prosecution Level of Intervention

In December 2010, the ICC again increased its level of
intervention in Kenya: It began investigating and prosecuting
specific suspects. In December 2010, the then-ICC prosecutor
shared with the press the names of the six prominent Kenyans
who he said would be charged with crimes against humanity
because they bore the greatest responsibility for the violence.231
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In March 2011, the ICC issued summonses for six prominent
Kenyans—three each from Kibaki’s and Odinga’s political
parties.232
According to the ICC prosecutor’s charges filed in 2010,
William Ruto, the former Minister of Higher Education, Science
and Technology and current Deputy President, Henry Kosgey,
Minister of Industrialization, and Joshua arap Sang, Head of
Operations at Kass FM, allegedly worked together to prepare a
criminal plan to attack members of the PNU. The charges state
they implemented the plan immediately after the announcement
of the election results declaring Kibaki president. Specifically,
they mobilized perpetrators to attack PNU supporters, which the
perpetrators did by burning homes and buildings and killing
civilians. The prosecutor charged that Uhuru Kenyatta, former
Deputy Prime Minister, Francis Muthaura, former Secretary to
the Cabinet, and Mohammad Ali, former Commissioner of the
Kenyan Police, responded to the attacks on PNU supporters by
developing and executing a plan to attack perceived ODM
supporters in order to keep the PNU in power. Among other
things, the charges state that Kenyatta facilitated a plan
whereby pro-PNU youth, including members of the Mungiki,
were employed to attack ODM civilian supporters in the Nakuru
and Naivasha districts of Kenya—attacks that left some 150
ODM supporters dead.233 On January 23, 2012, the Pre-Trial
Chamber confirmed charges against four out of the six
individuals, but it refused to confirm charges against Kosgey and
Ali because the prosecutor had not met the necessary evidentiary
threshold for proceeding.234
Above, we set out our reasons for expecting that an increased
level of intervention by the ICC should generally produce a
deterrent effect. We argued that increasing the ICC’s level of
intervention increases the costs, making it more likely that the
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ICC can legally dissuade individuals from committing crimes and
persuade the government to institute measures of domestic
accountability. In such cases, the ICC has demonstrated an
ability to act, and the rational actor should refrain from
committing any obvious bad acts that might attract additional
attention from the ICC. At the same time, we also hypothesized
that a very high level of ICC intervention may also produce an
unintended or perverse effect when it directly threatens leaders
seeking to hold or gain power. Under these circumstances, state
leaders in non-democracies or unconsolidated democracies may
conclude that there is little reason to refrain from committing
abuses that can aid them in their bid for power.
a.

Evidence Regarding Mass Atrocities and Other Human Rights
Abuses

During this investigation phase, the evidence does show a
reduction in mass atrocities in that Kenya’s 2013 presidential
elections were relatively peaceful.235 Further, the evidence
indicates that the ICC’s intervention likely played a role in
producing this outcome in two ways. First, in an effort to
discredit the ICC and defeat opponent Raila Odinga,236 ICC
suspects and former political and ethnical rivals, Kenyatta and
Ruto, created the Jubilee Coalition so that they could run for
president and deputy president, respectively, in Kenya’s 2013
elections.237 This may have mitigated tensions between different
ethnic groups. Numerous interviewees confirmed that the ICC
was the impetus for this unusual alliance. Others said that the
ICC involvement triggered the Jubilee Coalition, which in turn
may have contributed to more peaceful elections.238 Some
interviewees even argued that the ICC provided inspiration for
the coalition: “[Kenyatta and Ruto] were coming together to
defeat ICC”239 and “[t]he ICC was the glue.”240
235
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A review of the Jubilee Coalition’s campaign rhetoric further
confirms that the ICC cases pushed Kenyatta and Ruto together.
Kenyatta and Ruto turned the election into a referendum against
the ICC by using slogans such as (1) “[a] vote for us is a vote of no
confidence in the ICC,” used by Kenyatta and (2) “[p]residential
victory for the Jubilee Alliance may indicate there is something
wrong with the charges its two leaders are facing at The Hague,”
used by Ruto.241 Other campaign messages cast the ICC in a
negative light: the court was biased against Africa, it did not
investigate thoroughly, and it constituted an act of neocolonialism.242 Their anti-ICC rhetoric did not stop there. They
also focused their sights on their political opponent for the
presidency, Raila Odinga. According to statements of the Jubilee
Coalition, Odinga was actually guilty of committing crimes
during the 2007 post-election violence and was only voicing
support for the ICC in his campaign because he wanted to get rid
of Kenyatta and Ruto as political opponents, not because he
actually believed in the ICC and its norms.243
In addition, the ICC apparently played a role in causing
Kenyatta and Ruto to campaign in a way that did not incite
ethnic violence. In fact, in 2011, an ICC presiding judge told the
two ICC suspects during a court appearance that she had read
“newspaper reports to the effect that some of the suspects are
engaging in hate speech which could occasion fresh chaos” and
that such speeches “could be interpreted as inducement to violate
the conditions set by the court and which include that the
suspects should not commit fresh crimes within the jurisdiction
of the court.”244 The court warned that it was prepared to issue
new arrest warrants if the evidence showed that candidates were
preaching hatred. While direct causation is difficult to establish,
the candidates did begin preaching peace and reconciliation after

241
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this warning.245 The week before the 2013 elections, Kenyatta
and Ruto even joined together with opponent Odinga to hold a
prayer rally to promote non-violent elections.246
Preaching peace, instead of inter-ethnic violence, during
presidential election campaigns was a rather new phenomenon.
Kenya has a winner-takes-all system that gives winning
candidates unchallenged access to public office and ability to
control the distribution of state resources.247 The benefits
associated with obtaining a leadership position in Kenya’s
government are so high that politicians and their constituencies
have been willing to resort to violence to win.248 Additionally,
Kenya’s political leaders represent and advance the interests of
their ethnic group because the country’s political parties are
based on ethnicity.249 This means that the ethnic groups whose
leaders lose the elections will most likely be denied full access to
important resources, jobs, income, and healthcare until the next
In Kenya, electing a new president
political transition.250
becomes a highly charged competition for ethnic supremacy.251
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But 2013 was different, and numerous interviewees noted
the break with the past. One interviewee stated that Kenyatta,
Ruto, and other politicians chose their words more carefully than
in the past since they knew the ICC was watching; they did not
want to be accused of saying anything that seemed to incite
violence. Several mentioned that in the 2013 presidential
campaign, unlike the campaigns of the past, the candidates were
careful not to be seen with any military gangs—apparently in the
past, candidates gave speeches with military gangs carrying
weapons in the background as a show of force.252 According to a
member of a non-governmental organization, Kenyan civil society
used the fact of the ICC’s presence to remind candidates that if
they said anything that incited violence, it would put them at
greater risk with the ICC.253 Another interviewee even argued
that Kenyatta and Ruto refrained from inciting violence during
the 2013 elections as this could provide evidence for them to
suggest that they also did not incite violence during the 2007
elections.254
Consistent with our expectations, the ICC’s increased level of
intervention seems to have produced some deterrent effect in the
form of more peaceful elections in 2013. That result makes sense
from a rational cost-benefit standpoint. Kenyan leaders knew
that the ICC was watching them, and interview evidence
indicates that leaders had altered their views about the threat
posed by the ICC. Kenyan politicians could no longer “play the
games” they did with the domestic justice system and “could not
unduly influence the ICC prosecutor or the ICC judges to rule in
their favors.”255 Indeed, the ICC’s powers were sufficient to
convince the Kenyan suspects to voluntarily appear in The
Hague in 2011 to answer the charges against them.256 And
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individuals we interviewed did say having their leaders
summoned to The Hague sent a powerful message about the
accountability of their leaders. The ICC reportedly contributed
to the “demystification” of the power of a sitting president.257
One interviewee said that the moment that the ICC prosecutor
announced the names of the suspects was a “game changer”.258
Another interviewee argued that up until this point people
thought it would just be “business as usual;”259 however, when
the names were presented, Kenyans changed their perceptions
about justice since the “untouchables could now be touched.”260
On the other hand, the evidence shows that the ICC’s
increased level of intervention has also produced an unintended
or perverse effect. While the threat increased the cost side of the
equation, it also seems to have caused influential state actors to
even more highly value power and to take steps to ensure they
could obtain or hold on to power. They did not commit obvious
crimes: Kenyatta and Ruto were careful to preach peace after
the ICC judge warned that additional charges would be
forthcoming if the evidence showed the leaders were preaching
hate. But as the trials grew nearer, so too did reports that state
leaders were interfering with the ICC’s witnesses.
The OTP dropped its case against Muthaura in March 2013
after one key witness against that defendant admitted to
receiving bribes and lying to the court.261 In May 2013, the ICC
prosecutor informed the ICC judges that prosecution witnesses in
the Kenyatta and Ruto cases had reported being targeted by
Kenyan government officials seeking to influence their
testimony.262 Although the suspects in the Kenya cases deny that
they have played any part in having witnesses bribed, the ICC
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did issue an arrest warrant for Kenyan journalist, Walter
Barasa, for allegedly furthering a bribery scheme devised by a
circle of officials within the Kenyan administration.263
Witness interference has gone beyond offering bribes. In
2013, twelve witnesses who were scheduled to testify in the trial
against Ruto and Sang said they had received persistent threats
to their safety warning them of participating in the trial.264 In
early 2014, the OTP withdrew from its witness list several
witnesses against Kenyatta who were “concerned that testifying
against Mr. Kenyatta would expose them or their families to
retaliation.”265 According to the OTP, the Kenyan government
led by Kenyatta and Ruto was not doing its part to put an end to
the pervasive practice of witness tampering.266 Ultimately, so
many witnesses backed out from testifying at the ICC because of
witness interference267 that the OTP dropped its cases against
Muthaura and Kenyatta.268
Individuals we interviewed said they believed the OTP’s
claims that the Kenyan government had interfered with
witnesses. One said that it is to be expected that a government
would not turn over evidence against itself.269 Another said that
some portion of the Kenyan public thinks that Kenyatta, Ruto,
263
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of Charges Against Mr. Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta (Dec. 5, 2014), https://www.icccpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=otp-statement-05-12-2014-2.
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and their supporters have been involved in threatening
witnesses.270 Finally, one interviewee said that although the
Kenyan government is supposed to ensure that witnesses are
protected, “no rational man would really want to testify against
the president.”271
b.

Evidence Regarding Domestic Mechanisms To Punish Human
Rights Abuses

Despite its new constitution and judicial reforms, between
2010 and December 2014, the facts show that Kenya has made
little or no effort to hold individuals accountable for the postelection violence.272 As of early 2014, apparently only twentyfour suspects had been convicted in the more than 6,000 cases
that had been pending for potential domestic prosecution.273
Further, in February 2014, the Office of the Director of Public
Prosecutions declared that it was dropping 4,000 cases because
Likewise, many
they were impossible to prosecute.274
interviewees stated that the Kenyatta government had made it
clear that it would not be seeking to prosecute perpetrators of the
violence.275 President Kenyatta’s State of the Nation address in
early 2015 supports that conclusion. There, Kenyatta indicated
that successful prosecutions would face difficulties due to
“inadequate evidence, inability to identify perpetrators,
witnesses [sic] fear of reprisals, and the general lack of technical
and forensic capacity.”276 He also confirmed as much, stating
that national efforts would be restorative in nature, not
retributive.277

270

Interview with Subject 582, 568.
Interview with Subject 568.
272
ONE YEAR IN OFFICE, supra note 215, at 14.
273
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274
See Luke Moffett, After the Collapse of the Kenyatta Case, How is the ICC
Supposed To Help Victims?, THE CONVERSATION (Dec. 10, 2014, 6:38 AM),
http://theconversation.com/after-the-collapse-of-the-kenyatta-case-how-is-the-iccsupposed-to-help-victims-34991.U.N.
275
Interview with Subject 333.
276
Victor Tinto, Full State of the Nation Address by President Uhuru Kenyatta,
NEWS24 KENYA (Mar. 26, 2015, 6:30 PM), http://m.news24.com/Kenya/MyNews
24/Full-State-of-the-Nation-address-by-president-Uhuru-Kenyatta-20150326.
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During this same time period, Kenya’s leaders have also
refused to embrace the ICC processes as a mechanism to redress
the harms suffered by the many victims of the violence.278
Instead, Kenyan leaders have made numerous attempts to rid
themselves of the ICC. Only a few days after the announcement
of the names of the suspects in December 2010, the Kenyan
government passed a motion to withdraw from the ICC279—even
though polls at that time showed that most ordinary Kenyans
supported having the cases tried in the ICC so that perpetrators
of the violence would not enjoy impunity.280 The Kenyan
Parliament again voted to withdraw from the court in September
2013.281 Further, a member of parliament submitted a resolution
to repeal the 2008 International Crimes Act.282
In addition, Kenya has lobbied the international community
and the ICC in an effort to have the cases halted.283 In early
2011, Kenya was successful in its bid to get the African Union to
back a request to have the ICC cases deferred so that Kenya
could try the cases locally.284 Kenya took that same request to
the U.N. Security Council in 2011, but it was denied.285 In 2013,
the U.N. Security Council again rejected Kenya’s bid to have it
278
See Kenya President: International Criminal Court Not Impartial, VOA
NEWS (Dec. 12, 2016, 9:21 AM), http://www.voanews.com/a/kenya-president-intern
ational-criminal-court-not-impartial/3632789.html.
279
Michael Onyiego, Kenya’s Politicians Look To Withdraw from ICC as
Suspects Named, VOA NEWS (Dec. 16, 2010), http://www.voanews.com/a/kenyaspoliticians-look-to-withdraw-from-icc-as-suspects-named--111998579/157058.html;
see Kenya President: International Criminal Court Not Impartial, supra note 278.
280
James Verini, The Prosecutor and the President, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (June 22,
2016),
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/26/magazine/international-criminal-courtmoreno-ocampo-the-prosecutor-and-the-president.html.
281
MG Zimeta, What Kenya’s Withdrawal Means for the International Criminal
Court, THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 6, 2013, 11:41 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/com
mentisfree/2013/sep/06/kenya-withdrawal-icc-credibility.
282
See Mark Kersten, The ICC and Kenya Parting Ways? What It Means and
What It Doesn’t, JUSTICE IN CONFLICT (Sept. 5, 2013), http://justiceinconflict.org/
2013/09/05/icc-and-kenya-parting-ways-what-it-means-and-what-it-doesnt/
(referencing a motion to repeal the International Crimes Act).
283
Michael Onyiego, Kenya Seeks Another Way To Stall Hague Proceedings,
VOA NEWS (Mar. 20, 2011, 8:00 PM), http://www.voanews.com/content/kenya-seeksanother-way-to-stall-hague-proceedings-118352894/136823. [hereinafter Onyiego,
Kenya Seeks Another Way].
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Michael Onyiego, Criticism as Kenya Lobbies U.N. for ICC Deferral, VOA
NEWS (Mar. 6, 2011, 7:00 PM), http://www.voanews.com/content/criticism-as-kenyalobbies-un-for-icc-deferral-117527313/157598.html.
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See id. (noting the AU’s approval to seek deferral); Onyiego, Kenya Seeks
Another Way, supra note 283.
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intervene to halt the ICC cases.286 In proceedings before the ICC
itself, the Kenyan defendants challenged the ICC’s jurisdiction
claiming that Kenya should be permitted to try any cases
domestically.287 The ICC denied that motion on the grounds that
there were no national proceedings involving the same crimes
and the crimes met the threshold of gravity to fall within the
court’s jurisdiction.288
After Kenyatta and Ruto assumed their positions as
president and deputy president, the evidence arguably supports a
conclusion that the ICC’s demonstrated threat to prosecute may
have produced a perverse effect: It pushed the country’s leaders
into a corner, and they responded by taking actions to ensure
that they would not be held accountable for any human rights
abuses.289 After gaining power in March 2013, Kenyatta and
Ruto continued their campaign against the ICC.290 They also
used their position as leaders to assist those lobbying efforts.291
They lobbied the African Union to urge the ICC against
prosecuting heads of state. At the time the ICC brought its cases
against Kenyatta and Ruto, they were not heads of state.
Nevertheless, the African Union was persuaded, and in October
2013, it issued a call to halt the ICC case against Kenyatta and
any sitting presidents going forward.292
Further, in a report that Kenyatta submitted to parliament
together with his State of the Nation address in early 2015, he
requested the parliament to act upon the resolution that was
passed several years ago to break with the ICC:

286
See Michelle Nichols, Africa Fails To Get Kenya ICC Trials Deferred at
United Nations, REUTERS (Nov. 15, 2013, 4:01 PM), http://www.reuters.com/ar
ticle/2013/11/15/us-kenya-icc-un-idUSBRE9AE0S420131115.
287
Onyiego, Kenya Seeks Another Way, supra note 283.
288
Prosecutor v. Ruto, Case No. ICC-01/09-19, Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of
the Rome Statute on the Authorization of an Investigation into the Situation in the
Republic of Kenya, ¶¶ 187, 198–00 (Mar. 31, 2010).
289
See Verini, supra note 280.
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See Marlise Simons & Jeffrey Gettleman, International Criminal Court
Drops Case Against Kenya’s William Ruto, N.Y. TIMES (April 5, 2016),
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/06/world/africa/william-ruto-kenya-icc.html
[hereinafter Simons & Gettleman, ICC Drops Case].
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See African Union Urges ICC to Defer Uhuru Kenyatta Case, BBC NEWS (Oct.
12, 2013), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-24506006.
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The National Executive is aware that the National Assembly of
the 10th Parliament approved a resolution “To Suspend Any
Links, Cooperation and Assistance” with the ICC. This position
was subsequently affirmed by a Resolution of the National
Assembly on 5th September, 2013 and by the Senate on 11th
September, 2013 respectively. Parliament is urged to take such
necessary measures to ensure the actualization of this
resolution but to do so in a manner that respects our
Constitutional Order.293

Finally, our interviews indicate that while the new
constitution remains in place, the Kenyan government is
nevertheless rolling back reforms contemplated by that
Kenyatta, for example, allegedly replaced
document.294
individuals from the judiciary with those friendly to the
establishment.295 Documentary data and statements during
interviews also indicate that Kenyatta is working to silence civil
society.296 According to Human Rights Watch, in 2011, Ruto told
local NGOs to stop asking their foreign donors to support the ICC
intervention and compiling reports about the post-election
violence.297 In addition, Kenyatta and Ruto branded all of
Kenya’s civil society as their enemies and as the pawns of
foreigners298 in response to a lawsuit brought by several local
non-profits that argued the two should not be able to run for
office because the ICC indictments showed that they did not meet
new Constitutional requirements calling for public officials to
have integrity.299
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(Nov. 15, 2013), http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/2013/11/15/kenyan-civil-societyunder-threat.
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See Kenya: Rights Defenders Under Attack, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Oct. 4,
2013, 4:34 AM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2013/10/04/kenya-rights-defenders-und
er-attack.
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See id.
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See Jeffrey Gettleman, Kenyan Court Rejects Suit Against Presidential
Candidate, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 15, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/16/world/
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The Kenyatta government also put forward a bill to limit
foreign funding for NGOs in Kenya—which would mean that
many could not continue to exist.300 The bill was defeated, but
the government has still deregistered some organizations,
claiming, for example, that they were linked to terrorism.301 Civil
society is even under attack at the ICC. Kenyatta’s and Ruto’s
lawyers have claimed that the ICC witnesses against them have
been coached to lie by human rights activists in Kenya who
receive backing from foreign donors.302
2.

Assessing the Social Deterrent Effect

The evidence of a social deterrent effect during this time
period again seems weak. The international community put
significant pressure on Kenya leading up to the presidential
elections. The United Kingdom, France, and the United States
were all arguing against having Kenyatta and Ruto run for office
and seemed to be backing Odinga.303 Those countries stated
publicly that they would cut off diplomatic relations with Kenya
if the ICC indictees succeeded in their election campaign.304
Johnnie Carson, a senior official in the U.S. State Department,
went on record opposing the duo’s campaign, stating “choices
have consequences.”305 But all of the West’s warnings seem to
have fallen on deaf ears: Kenyatta and Ruto ran for office and
300
See Maina Kiai, In Kenya, Averting a Move to Strangle Civil Society with the
Financial Noose, OPEN DEMOCRACY (Dec. 18, 2013), https://www.opende
mocracy.net/openglobalrights/maina-kiai/in-kenya-averting-move-to-strangle-civilsociety-with-financial-noose; see also interview with Subject 582.
301
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Society Protests, DAILY NATION (Oct. 24, 2014), http://www.nation.co.ke/news/
politics/Civil-Society-ICC-Hague-Cases-Jubilee-Government/-/1064/2499628//kylkb4z/-/index.html.
303
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304
See Stephen Brown & Rosalind Raddatz, Dire Consequences or Empty
Threats? Western Pressure for Peace, Justice and Democracy in Kenya, 8 J. E. AFR.
STUD. 43, 51, 53 (2014); see also Alex Perry, Kenya’s Election: What Uhuru
Kenyatta’s Victory Means for Africa, TIME (March 9, 2013), http://world.
time.com/2013/03/09/kenyas-election-what-uhuru-kenyattas-victory-means-forafrica/; Joint Report, ICC: Are Kenya’s Allies Ready To Abandon their Strategic
Interests?, THE EAST AFRICAN (Feb. 16. 2013, 6:08 PM), http://www.th
eeastafrican.co.ke/news/Will-Kenya-Western-allies-abandon-strategic-interest//2558/1696134/-/jrnu0h/-/index.html.
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VOA NEWS (Feb. 7, 2013, 10:42 AM), http://www.voanews.com/content/us-officialsays-kenya-elections-have-consequences/1599063.html.
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won using a campaign strategy that billed the ICC as antiAfrican and a tool of the neo-colonialist West “to limit the control
wielded by Kenya’s political elites.”306 And they turned Carson’s
statement against him, reportedly responding to this “Western
interference” by stating “they said choices have consequences: we
will show them.”307 Not only did the international community’s
“shaming” have no apparent effect, but also the West did not hold
long to its threats about cutting off contact with Kenyan leaders.
Notwithstanding that Kenyatta was still facing ICC charges, in
2013 and 2014, respectively, then-UK Prime Minister David
Cameron and then-President Barack Obama welcomed Kenyatta
to their countries.308
On the domestic side, the evidence also shows a push for
accountability. The civil society organization, Kenyans for Peace
with Truth and Justice, urged Kenyan leaders to bring to justice
the perpetrators of the post-election violence.309 Initially, the
Kenyan public was pushing for trials in The Hague. In October
2010, before the ICC prosecutor released the names of the
suspects, 68% of Kenyans supported the ICC. But Kenyan
leaders opted for obstruction, rather than accountability,310 and
they reaped rewards for doing so: In March 2013, the populace
chose Kenyatta and Ruto to govern. Further, it seems that the
anti-ICC campaign strategy also worked. By mid-2013, support
for the ICC had dropped to 39%—with only 7% of those polled in
the Central Province and 24% of those polled in the Rift Valley
supporting trials in The Hague.311
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D. The Aftermath: Post-December 2014
After the OTP withdrew the charges against Kenyatta, the
Kenya cases included only Ruto and Sang.312 After several
delays, the ICC trial against the two defendants began on
September 10, 2013.313 The trial was suspended at the end of
September 2013 to allow Ruto time to address a terrorist attack
in Nairobi.314 Proceedings against Ruto subsequently continued,
but he successfully convinced the court to permit him to be
absent. In early 2014, the Trial Chamber ruled that Ruto’s
presence would not be required except for key hearings, provided
that a waiver is filed.315
As it had in the Kenyatta case, the ICC prosecutor also
argued that it was facing problems with witness intimidation in
its case against Ruto.316 In late June 2015, ICC prosecutors
reported that they had tapes of conversations indicating that
persons purporting to act on behalf of Ruto were bribing and
intimidating witnesses.317 Although Ruto’s lawyers denied the
charges, the Trial Chamber was persuaded that the prosecutor’s
allegations of witness intimidation had some merit. The Trial
312
The OTP has issued arrest warrants for Walter Osapiri Barasa, a journalist,
Philip Kipkoech Bett, and Paul Gicheru, a lawyer. See Prosecutor v. Barasa, Case
No. ICC-01/09-01/13, Warrant of Arrest (Aug. 2, 2013), https://www.icccpi.int/courtrecords/cr2013_06445.pdf; see also Prosecutor v. Gicheru, Case No. ICC01/09-01/15, Order Unsealing the Warrant of Arrest and Other Documents (Sept. 10,
2015).
313
See Mike Corder, Trial Starts for Kenya Deputy President Ruto, YAHOO NEWS
(Sept. 10, 2013), http://news.yahoo.com/trial-starts-kenya-deputy-president-ruto074906970.html.
314
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(Sept. 23, 2013), http://www.nation.co.ke/news/politics/ICC-allows-William-Ruto-toleave-Hague-over-Westgate-attack/1064-2003820-nchne3/index.html.
315
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(June 18, 2013), https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=pr920&ln=en.
316
In fact, in March 2015, the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber II granted the ICC
prosecutor’s request to issue arrest warrants for two individuals for their alleged
roles in corruptly inducing prosecution witnesses to withdraw as witnesses or recant
their prior statements to the prosecutor. See Statement, ICC OTP, Statement of the
Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Fatou Bensouda, Regarding the
Unsealing of Arrest Warrants in the Kenya Situation (Sep. 10, 2015),
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Arrest and Other Documents (Sept. 10, 2015).
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Chamber ruled that the prosecutor would be permitted to admit
the prior recorded testimonies of witnesses against Ruto in the
trial inasmuch as the “element of systematicity of the
interference of several witnesses in this case which gives rise to
the impression of an attempt to methodically target witnesses of
this case in order to hamper the proceedings.”318
The OTP’s case against Ruto was weakened in February
2016 when the ICC’s Appeals Chamber reversed the Trial Court’s
The Appeals Chamber
decision on witness statements.319
concluded that the Trial Chamber incorrectly relied on Rule 68 of
Rules of Procedure and Evidence to permit previously recorded
witness statements to be introduced for the truth of their
contents.320 However, the Appeals Chamber noted that the
relied-upon provisions in Rule 68 only came into force in
November 2013—after the trial against Ruto and Sang had
commenced.321 The Appeals Chamber stated that applying that
rule retroactively to the detriment of the accused would be
improper.322 Because of this decision, the ICC Trial Chamber
would not be able to consider the recorded witness statements in
making their determination on the Ruto and Sang case. Shortly
after the Appeals Chamber’s decision, in April 2016 an ICC Trial
Chamber vacated the OTP’s cases against both Ruto and Sang.323
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statements.”).
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Admission of Prior Recorded Testimony ¶ 3 (Feb. 12, 2016) (Rule 68 allows witness
statements to be admitted in evidence against the accused where there is a finding
of witness interference.).
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Characterizing the ICC’s level of intervention up until late
2015 when our interviews in Kenya concluded presents an initial
challenge before discussing any evidence of a deterrent effect or
lack thereof. In one sense, the level of intervention is quite high
as the ICC was proceeding with prosecutions against Ruto and
Sang. It was demonstrating its willingness and ability to carry
out the threat of prosecution that is relevant to the cost side of
the deterrence calculus.
Other evidence, though, shows a
somewhat weakened ICC threat because of defeats the OTP
suffered. The OTP was forced to drop its cases against Muthaura
and Kenyatta—forced because Kenya allegedly obstructed the
court’s ability to gather evidence and convince witnesses to
testify. Further, and related to the case against Ruto and Sang,
although a trial court concluded that Ruto himself tampered with
witnesses, the OTP then lost a legal battle. The outcome was
that the OTP could not use recanted, but previously recorded
witness statements, in its trial against Ruto and Sang.
Reaching definitive conclusions about whether the ICC
produced a deterrent effect during this time period also poses a
challenge given the fact that our interviews with high-level
subjects in Kenya ended in October 2015.
Our tentative
conclusion is that even after the OTP suspended its case against
Kenyatta, the ICC still had some power to deter.324 After all, as
stipulated by interviewees, the case against Kenyatta was only
suspended, which technically means that the OTP can reopen it
with new evidence.325 In addition, interviewees said that the fact
that the charges were still pending against Ruto in late 2015
played a role in keeping elites from orchestrating any ethnic
violence. One interviewee specifically stated that the fact that
the ICC was still pursuing Deputy President Ruto was “holding
back political violence.”326 Others said that the pending ICC
cases continued to instill some level of fear in Kenyans and the
notion that no one is above the law.327 Yet, the interviewees did
not necessarily view this absence of violence as permanent.
Other interviewees hypothesized that “tensions may increase
when people realize that perpetrators can just do whatever they
want” and seem to be able “to go back and forth to The Hague”
324
325
326
327
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without any repercussions.328 Another interviewee argued that
the fact that “people [in Kenya] are praying for the suspects, and
not for the victims” suggests that the ICC’s presence has not
produced a lasting change in how people in Kenya view
violence.329
Further, a number of interviewees said that they were not
certain that the 2017 elections would be peaceful like the
elections in 2013.330 Many expressed the view that the outcome
of the Ruto case could significantly impact the security situation
in Kenya. Some believed that a Ruto conviction would harm the
Jubilee Coalition, a coalition that was able to bring together two
different ethnic groups that had previously done battle during
elections.331 Others went even further and cautiously predicted
that a Ruto conviction could trigger ethnic violence.332 An
opinion poll echoes this sentiment, revealing that the majority of
the population expected ethnic violence if the ICC did convict
Ruto.333 We heard reports of celebrations amongst the Kikuyu
people when the ICC dropped its case against Kenyatta.334 Ruto’s
Kalenjin followers apparently believed that the ICC case against
him should also be dropped. One interviewee recommended this
way forward—dropping the Ruto case—so as to avoid any
Ruto’s supporters, in fact, have alleged that
tensions.335
Kenyatta has abandoned Ruto, making him fight against the ICC
on his own.336 A quote by one governor in September 2015 is
328
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illustrative: “We are still seeking answers as to why the deputy
president still has a case at the ICC yet the President is a free
man.”337 Some allegations go further and accuse Kenyatta of
“fixing” the evidence so that Ruto was brought before the ICC in
the first place.338 According to one submission: “We have no
option to conclude that Uhuru Kenyatta did everything to get
Ruto to The Hague and has done nothing to get Ruto out of The
Hague.”339 In other words, elites seem to be setting the stage for
pitting one ethnicity against the other as they have done in the
past when the stakes are high.
In sum, the evidence suggests some “at the moment” legal
deterrent effect in that Kenya is not currently experiencing any
ethnic violence. However, the evidence does not unequivocally
show that the ICC’s intervention has caused people in Kenya to
forever renounce violence or the threat of violence.
Finally, there is also little evidence suggesting any social
deterrent effect during this time period. Telling is the fact that
President Barack Obama visited Kenya in July 2015, meeting
with President Kenyatta who had only recently been the subject
of an ICC indictment for allegedly committing crimes against
humanity.340 George Kegoro, Executive Director of the Kenyan
Section of the International Commission of Jurists, stated that
Obama’s visit departs from the “choices have consequences”
warning.
It suggests that in fact “no choices have
consequences.”341 Kegoro further opined that the visit helped
Kenya regain acceptance by the international community and
move away from its pariah status.342 Our interviewees made
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similar points. They believed that Obama’s visit to Kenya helped
the Kenyan leadership to rehabilitate the country’s image. The
visit thus has had a “legitimizing force.”343
CONCLUSION
This case study of Kenya’s interactions with the ICC over
time reveals the complexities of gauging the ICC’s deterrent
power and the need to have a greater understanding of how
deterrence works and what factors influence whether and under
what conditions the ICC should or should not be able to deter.
We used a deep dive narrative with on-the-ground evidence from
Kenya to “unpack” the ICC’s deterrent effect. The Kenya case
study has demonstrated that deterrence, or lack thereof, varies
over time and as regards different actors in different situations.
The evidence shows that ratification alone did not produce a
deterrent effect, nor did it lead to a decrease in mass atrocities or
an increase in domestic mechanisms available to punish abuses.
On the other hand, the evidence showed that higher levels of ICC
intervention, investigations and prosecutions, seem to have led to
a decrease in mass atrocities.
Nonetheless, the evidence does not thus far show that the
ICC has produced a lasting deterrent effect in Kenya: The
evidence does not confirm normative change with respect to
instrumentally inciting violence or permitting impunity. Kenyan
leaders allegedly committed human rights abuses in order to
make the ICC evidence against them go away. Moreover,
interviewees did not say that large-scale violence was now
something of the past. Nor did they indicate that a new era has
begun in Kenya where elites would be held accountable for their
role in committing mass violence. Several interviewees noted
that Kenya seems to be back to “business as usual,” as
democratic reforms envisioned by the 2010 constitution have
been reversed,344 and ethnicity is again front and center in the
election campaigns dividing the country and fueling tensions.345
The evidence gathered in this Kenya case study also reveals
an issue for the ICC going forward regarding its ability to deter
criminal behavior when its interventions focus on state leaders of

343
344
345

Interview with Subject 444.
Interview with Subject 576.
Interview with Subject 475, 219.

2017]

DETERRENT EFFECT OF THE ICC

175

non-democracies or unconsolidated democracies. Often these are
the very people who are able to control the state machinery and
as a result are not only able to frustrate the domestic criminal
process, but also the ICC process that relies heavily on state
cooperation. This analysis is only a first step towards a greater
understanding of the ICC’s deterrent effect. Additional studies
could help flesh out conditions that make it more likely that the
ICC deters and produces the desired normative change and
lasting deterrent effect, rather than an unintended or perverse
effect. Since some of the Kenya cases were dropped due to lack of
evidence, future research could focus on how the ICC may best
collect evidence at the outset of a case and when government
leaders may not expect that they would be indicted, and thus, be
more cooperative. The use of plea agreements with cooperation
provisions deserves further examination in this respect as well.
In fact, the OTP has stated that it may start investigating some
lower level perpetrators “in order to ultimately have a reasonable
chance to convict the most responsible.”346 If the OTP has
cooperating witnesses, then it should not have the same
problems it has experienced in the Kenya cases with witnesses
disappearing or recanting.
Reframing the debate by unpacking the deterrent effect of
the court allows for a more nuanced understanding that is
necessary to ensure that the ICC carries out its mandate in a
way that makes it most likely to produce the desired norm
change and lasting deterrent effect envisaged by the drafters of
the Rome Statute.
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